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Abstract
This Article ultimately recommends that courts should reign in, if not abandon, the doctrine
of equitable estoppel as it is used in Hague child abduction cases. This Article supports its thesis
in four parts. Part I describes the equitable estoppel argument as it has emerged within the Hague
Convention framework. Part II then examines the Convention’s legislative history and argues that
the doctrine is incompatible with that history. Part III analyzes the principle policy basis offered in
support of the doctrine: the deterrence of concealment. Part IV focuses on the best way to address
concealment within the confines of the Convention structure.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 2000, there has been a surge in the number of court
opinions addressing the question whether equitable estoppel can
be successfully invoked in child abduction cases arising under the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction ("Hague Abduction Convention" or "Convention").'
Attention to this issue is not surprising. Although the doctrine
was initially rejected in a few cases between 1997 and 1998,2 the
potential for the concept to defeat one of the defenses to an
action initiated under the Hague Abduction Convention has led
petitioning parties to raise the argument repeatedly. The
argument eventually succeeded in 2002,3 and since then a
growing number of courts have accepted and applied the
doctrine of equitable estoppel in international child abduction
cases.
4
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1. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Abduction Convention].
2. See Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 946 (11th Cir. 1998) (passing on the issue); In re
Robinson, 983 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 n.10 (D. Colo. 1997) (rejecting the doctrine in
dicta); Wojcik v. Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. 413, 420-21 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (determining the
doctrine to be inapplicable to the facts of the case).
3. See Bocquet v. Ouzid, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1348-50 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Mendez
Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1362 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
4. See, e.g., In re B del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2009); Duarte v.
Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 569-71 (9th Cir. 2008); Fumes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723-24
(11th Cir. 2004); Dietz v. Dietz, No. 6:07-CV-1398, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70208, at *18
(W.D. La. Sept. 17, 2008), affd, No. 08-31003, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 23200 (5th Cir.
Oct. 20, 2009); Arguelles v. Vasquez (In re Hague Child Abduction), No. 08-2030-CM,
2008 U.S. WL 913325, at *9-10 (D. Kan. Mar. 17, 2008); Ibarra v. Quintanilla Garcia,
476 F. Supp. 2d 630, 636 (D. Ariz. 2007); Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 06-cv-
2548, 2007 WL 2071957, at *5-7 (N.D. Ohio July 13, 2007);Jimenez v. Lozano, No. C05-
5736, 2007 WL 527499, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 2007); Van Driessche v. Ohio-
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However, not all courts accept the doctrine, 5 and a
showdown is imminent between those courts that embrace the
doctrine and those that reject it. The former see it as essential to
discouraging the secreting of abducted children. The latter
believe the doctrine undermines children's need for stability.
Because only four federal appellate courts have addressed the
issue to date,6 and since one of the decisions is nonbinding,7 the
time is ripe for a scholarly evaluation of the issue and the merits
of each side's position.
This Article undertakes such an evaluation. It ultimately
recommends that courts reign in, if not abandon, the doctrine of
equitable estoppel as it is used in Hague child abduction cases.
The doctrine raises administrative concerns, is inconsistent with
the Convention's legislative history, and is unnecessary. It also
renders irrelevant certain evidence that courts should be
considering when they decide whether to return abducted
children. Courts would be in a better position to advance the
Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848-54 (S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Ahumada Cabrera, 323
F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1312-13 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Giampaolo v. Erneta, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1269,
1281 (N.D. Ga. 2004); Belay v. Getachew, 272 F. Supp. 2d 553, 564 n.5 (D. Md. 2003);
Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348-50; Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-63; Perez v.
Garcia, 198 P.3d 539, 544-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
5. A number of courts either reject the doctrine's applicability to Hague cases or
reject the application of the doctrine given the facts of the case. See, e.g., Katona v.
Kovacs, 148 Fed. App'x 158, 161 (4th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the district court's attempt to
apply the doctrine to reduce the time frame in which a parent must file the petition);
Nunez v. Ramirez, No. 07-01205, 2008 WL 898658, at *6-7 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2008)
(reasoning that "tolling" uproots settled children, contrary to the purpose of the well-
settled defense); Matovski v. Matovski, No. 06-cv4259, 2007 WL 2600862, at *11-12
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007) (rejecting the doctrine on the basis that the one-year period
under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
("Hague Abduction Convention" or "Convention") is not a limitations period that can
be subject to tolling and because relief under the well-settled defense is discretionary);
Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 872, 874-76 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (criticizing the
doctrine and rejecting its application to the facts of the case); see also Moreno v. Martin,
No. 08-22432-CIV, 2008 WL 4716958, at *20 n.21 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2008) (declining to
apply equitable principles to the facts of the case); Lopez v. Alcala, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1255,
1259 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (same); Muhlenkamp v. Blizzard, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1151-52
(E.D. Wash. 2007) (same); Robinson, 983 F. Supp. at 1345 & n.10 (same); Wojcik, 959 F.
Supp. at 413 (same); Terron v. Ruff, No. 48683-7-I, 2003 WL 1521967, *5 (Wash. Ct.
App. Mar. 24, 2003) (same).
6. In re B. del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1014-15 (permitting equitable estoppel); Dietz,
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 23200 (same); Duarte, 526 F.3d at 563 (same); Katona, 148 Fed.
App'x. at 158 (rejecting equitable relief on the facts); Fumes, 362 F.3d at 702
(permitting equitable estoppel).
7. Katona, 148 Fed. App'x at 158.
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welfare of abducted children if they rejected arguments based on
equitable estoppel and instead examined whether a child is
"settled" for purposes of the "well-settled" defense (the defense
to which the equitable estoppel doctrine is relevant).
This Article supports its thesis in four parts. Part I describes
the equitable estoppel argument as it has emerged within the
Convention framework. It details the contours of the doctrine
and highlights its various iterations. This Part suggests that the
variation in the requirements of the doctrine causes doctrinal
confusion and gives judges a level of discretion that is
inconsistent with the Convention's "well-settled" defense and
with general concepts ofjustice.
Part II then examines the Convention's legislative history
and argues that the doctrine is incompatible with that history.
This Part also examines whether there are other sources of
authority justifying the adoption of equitable estoppel-for
example, executive branch documents and foreign case law-and
concludes that these sources do not provide a sufficient
justification for the doctrine either.
Part III analyzes the principle policy basis offered in support
of the doctrine: the deterrence of concealment. Part III suggests
that courts need not rely upon the Hague Convention to
discourage concealment because there are other legal
mechanisms, such as criminal sanctions or tort actions, that
discourage concealment. Equitable estoppel itself is likely to have
minimal, if any, deterrent effect on other abductors'
concealment because it is found only in case law and is applied
inconsistently by courts. Part III then argues that the Convention
itself already addresses concealment, principally through the
determination of whether the child is "settled" for purposes of
the well-settled defense. It also suggests that some petitioners may
be able to institute a suit under the Hague Convention even
when the location of their child is unknown, thereby rendering
the equitable estoppel doctrine unnecessary. Finally, this Part
argues that deterring concealment (and abduction for that
matter) is not the only policy objective animating the
Convention, and that deterrence should sometimes take a back
seat to other values, especially when the emphasis on deterrence
interferes with the proper interpretation of the Convention.
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Part IV focuses on the best way to address concealment
within the confines of the Convention structure. Having already
established that U.S. treaty partners address concealment
through an interpretation of "settled" and through an
importation of discretion to return a child even if "settled," this
Part evaluates these alternatives. It concludes that courts should
address concealment in their assessment of whether the child is
"settled." This approach would best reflect the intent of the
Convention's framers, would maximize the effectiveness of
judicial review, and would lead to the most optimal outcomes for
abducted children.
I. THE RELEVANCE OF EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES TO THE
HAGUE ABDUCTION CONVENTION
A. The Well-Settled Defense and the One-Year Clock
A bit of contextualization helps illustrate the potential
significance that the doctrine of equitable estoppel affords to a
petitioner who seeks the return of his or her abducted child
pursuant to the Hague Abduction Convention. The Hague
Abduction Convention, a private international law treaty, is
implemented in the United States through the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA"). 8 The Convention
requires the return of abducted children to the place where they
were habitually resident immediately before their wrongful
removal or retention. 9 The Convention's remedy of "return"
seeks to reestablish the status quo ante and thereby deter
international child abduction. 10 The remedy, however, is subject
to a few limited defenses.
8. Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat. 437 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
11601-11).
9. See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
10. See, e.g., In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 395 (3d Cir. 2006); Shealy v.
Shealy, 295 F.3d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 2002); Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir.
2001); England v. England, 234 F.3d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 2000); Blondin v. Dubois, 189
F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1999); Shalit v. Coppe, 182 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999); Lops
v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 936 (11th Cir. 1998); Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 372 (8th Cir.
1995); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Hague
International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg.
10,494, 10,505 (Mar. 26, 1986) (indicating that "the Hague Convention seeks
restoration of the factual status quo ante" and is also "premised upon the notion that
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The defense most relevant to this Article permits a court to
refrain from returning the child if more than one year has passed
between the time of the wrongful abduction or retention and the
commencement of proceedings and "it is demonstrated that the
child is now settled in its new environment." l This defense,
sometimes referred to as the "well-settled" defense or the article
12(2) defense, is one of the most successful for Hague
Convention respondents, whether in the United States or
abroad. 12
Because the respondent can successfully invoke the well-
settled defense only if one year has passed between the wrongful
removal or retention and the commencement of proceedings,1 3
petitioners have tried various strategies to shorten the
accumulation of time and thereby deny the availability of the
defense. For example, some petitioners have argued that the
commencement of proceedings occurs when a petition is filed
with the Central Authority, an institution required in each
contracting state by article 6 of the Convention, rather than a
court. Most courts find this argument unpersuasive. 14 Other
petitioners have argued, more successfully, that the one-year
clock only starts to run when the abductor crosses an
international border and not when the abductor first absconds
with the child. 15 Courts have also accepted the argument that the
the child should be promptly restored to his or her country of habitual residence so that
a court there can examine the merits of the custody dispute").
11. Id. art. 12; see 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e) (2) (B) (2006) (codifying "preponderance of
evidence" as the burden of proof required to establish an article 12 defense).
12. See Nigel Lowe et al., Hague Conference on Private International Law, A
Statistical Analysis of Applications Made in 2003 Under the Hague Convention of 25 October
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, at 43-44, Preliminary Doc. No. 3,
Part I (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abdpd03e2006.pdf.
13. See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 12.
14. See Belay v. Getachew, 272 F. Supp. 2d 553, 561 (D. Md. 2003) (collecting
cases); Wojcik v. Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. 413, 418-20 (E.D. Mich. 1997); see also, e.g.,
Muhlenkamp v. Blizzard, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (E.D. Wash. 2007) (citing Wojich as
correct interpretation); Grijalva v. Escayola, No. 06-cv-569, 2006 WL 3827539, at *4
(M.D. Fl. Dec. 28, 2006) (same). But see In re A.V.P.G., 251 S.W.3d 117, 124-25 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding, with little reasoning, that the well-settled defense did not apply
because petitioner filed a request for return with the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children ("NCMEC"), and NCMEC is an "administrative body" for purposes
of stopping the one-year clock).
15. See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAw, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 39 (1999) (citing In re H (Minors) (Abduction:
Custody Rights), [1991] 2 A.C. 476 (H.L.) (appeals taken from Eng.)); see also Basil v.
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clock only starts to run when the abductor enters a country that is
subject to the Hague Abduction Convention.1 6 These issues all
relate to the availability of the well-settled defense by addressing
the accumulation of time between the abduction and the
commencement of proceedings.
Petitioners have raised yet another argument about the
accumulation of time in their efforts to stop the application of
the well-settled defense. That argument-and the focus of this
Article-relies upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel. In its
simplest form, the argument is as follows: if the petitioner was
unable, after a diligent effort, to locate the child and commence
suit within one year from the time of the child's abduction, then
the one-year clock should not start ticking until the petitioner
knew where the child was located.
This equitable estoppel argument should be distinguished
from an equitable tolling argument, which respondents to Hague
Convention proceedings have also successfully made.17 Whereas
"equitable estoppel" tends to refer to a situation in which the
respondent takes active steps to prevent the petitioner from
instituting suit,1 8 for example, by concealing the child's
Ibis Aida de Teresa Sosa, No. 07-cv-918, 2007 WL 2264599, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 6,
2007) (noting in passing that child removal occurred, for purposes of the Convention,
when an international border was crossed, which was five days after the mother left with
the children).
16. Bocquet v. Ouzid, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (finding that
equitable tolling applied to time period in which child was in Algeria, a nonsignatory to
the Hague Convention, despite not being hidden there).
17. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Nazor-Lurashi, No. 04-1276, 2004 WL 1202729 (D. P.R.
May 20, 2004).
18. The requirements for a successful equitable estoppel argument were aptly
summarized by the Seventh Circuit, albeit in another context:
Equitable estoppel-sometimes referred to as fraudulent concealment-
"comes into play if the defendant takes active steps to prevent the plaintiff
from suing in time," Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-51
(7th Cir.1990), "such as by hiding evidence or promising not to plead the
statute of limitations," Speer v. Rand McNally & Co., 123 F.3d 658, 663 (7th
Cir.1997). [T]his doctrine contemplates that "the plaintiff has discovered, or
... should have discovered, that the defendant injured him, and denotes
efforts by the defendant-above and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the
plaintiffs claim is founded-to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time."
[Cada,] 920 F.2d at 451. The "granting of equitable estoppel should be
premised on a defendant's improper conduct as well as a plaintiffs actual and
reasonable reliance thereon." Wheeldon v. Monon Corp., 946 F.2d 533, 537
(7th Cir.1991).
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whereabouts, "equitable tolling" refers to a situation in which the
petitioner's failure to institute proceedings in a timely manner is
attributable to another factor.19 For example, equitable tolling
might apply if a court clerk gives the petitioner incorrect
information. 20
Unfortunately, courts that discuss equitable principles are
not consistent in their use of the terms, and many courts
adjudicating Hague petitions, like courts in other areas, 21 use
Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health Sci., 167 F.3d 1170, 1174 (7th Cir. 1999)
(second omission in original) (citations omitted); see also Campau v. Orchard Hills
Psychiatric Ctr., 946 F. Supp. 507, 512 n.8 (E.D. Mich. 1996) ("Equitable estoppel arises
when 'the defendant takes active steps ... above and beyond the wrongdoing upon
which plaintiffs claim is founded to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time.'" (omission
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Cada, 920 F.2d at 451)).
19. Equitable tolling applies in "extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff's
control" that prohibit a timely filing. Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003);
Boyd v. McWilliams, No. CV-06-803, 2007 WL 1670155, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 8, 2007)
(citing similar language); see also Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 1998)
("The doctrine of equitable tolling preserves plaintiffs claims when strict application of
the statute of limitations would be inequitable."). A litigant seeking equitable tolling
must meet two elements: "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)
that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.
408, 418 (2005).
20. Case law regularly differentiates between equitable estoppel and equitable
tolling in other contexts. See, e.g., Chung v. U.S. Dept. ofJustice, 333 F.3d 273, 278 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) ("There is a difference in effect as well: Equitable estoppel takes the statute of
limitations out of play for as long as is necessary to prevent the defendant from
benefiting from his misconduct, whilst equitable tolling-as a method for adjusting the
rights of two 'innocent parties'-merely ensures that the plaintiff is not, by dint of
circumstances beyond his control, deprived of a 'reasonable time' in which to file suit."
(citation omitted) (citing Cada, 920 F.2d at 452)); Hentosh, 167 F.3d at 1174 ("Unlike
the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the applicability of equitable tolling does not turn on
any effort by the defendant to prevent the plaintiff from filing suit."); Browning v. AT&T
Paradyne, 120 F.3d 222, 226 (lth Cir. 1997) ("Equitable estoppel does require an
allegation of misconduct on the part of the party against whom it is made, but equitable
tolling does not require any misconduct on the part of the defendant."); Bell v. Fowler,
99 F.3d 262, 266 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Equitable tolling does not require any misconduct
on the part of the defendant. On the other hand, the doctrine of equitable estoppel
focuses on the defendant's conduct." (citing Dring v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 58 F.3d
1323, 1328 (8th Cir.1995))); Felty v. Graves-Humphreys, Co., 785 F.2d 516, 519 (4th Cir.
1986) ("Equitable tolling focuses on the plaintiffs excusable ignorance of the
employer's discriminatory act. Equitable estoppel, in contrast, examines the defendant's
conduct and the extent to which the plaintiff has been induced to refrain from
exercising his rights." (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
21. See Browning, 120 F.3d at 226 (noting that litigants often confuse the doctrines
of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel); McAllister v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 87
F.3d 762, 767 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Several courts, including the Supreme Court in
Irwin, have used the terms 'equitable tolling' and 'equitable estoppel' interchangeably."
(citing Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1991))); Heins v. Potter, 271 F.
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"equitable tolling" to describe situations in which the
defendant's bad acts inhibit the plaintiff's ability to file suit.22
Because equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are based on
quite different policy considerations, this Article endeavors to
distinguish between the two. Consequently, this Article uses
"equitable estoppel" to denote a situation in which the
respondent conceals, or at least fails to reveal, the child's location
after the abduction. If a court is imprecise and uses the term
equitable tolling to describe such a situation, quotation marks
are placed around the term tolling.
B. The Necessary Elements for Equitable Estoppel
As already mentioned, courts are divided on whether they
accept the doctrine of equitable estoppel in Hague child
abduction cases.23 Yet even those courts that accept the doctrine
vary in their description of the doctrine's essential elements.
A deceptive act (usually concealment) is typically necessary
to trigger the doctrine, 24  much like equitable estoppel
generally. 25 But the type of bad act that is sufficient spans a wide
spectrum. At one end, some courts require "intentional and
Supp. 2d 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing the terminology as "confusing" (citations
omitted)); Campau, 946 F. Supp. at 512 n.8 ("Equitable estoppel, also known as
fraudulent concealment, is not limited to the limitations context and is frequently
mislabeled 'equitable tolling.'" (citing Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 1308, 1314
(N.D. Ohio 1992), affd, 33 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 1994))). See, e.g., Oshiver v. Levin,
Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994) ("IT]here are three
principal, though not exclusive, situations in which equitable tolling may be
appropriate: (1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the
plaintiffs cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been
prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted
his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum." (citation omitted) (citing Sch. Dist. of
City of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16, 19-20 (3d Cir. 1981))).
22. Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1363 (M.D. Fla. 2002);
Bocquet v. Ouzid, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2002);Jimenez v. Lozano, No.
CO5-5736, 2007 WL 527499, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 2007).
23. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., In re B. del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009) (requiring as the
first essential element of equitable estoppel that "the abducting parent concealed the
child"); Fumes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 706, 723 (lth Cir. 2004) (applying the concept of
"equitable tolling" in cases "where the parent removing the child has secreted the child
from the parent seeking return").
25. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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significant steps to conceal [the child] for more than one year." 26
At the other end, some courts permit the doctrine to be
triggered by an abductor's failure to inform the left-behind
parent of the child's location, even if the abductor has not tried
to hide the child's location from the other parent,27 and even
though silence is usually not sufficient to support an equitable
estoppel claim in other contexts.2 8 In several of these "omission"
cases, the left-behind parent knows the country in which the
child is located, but lacks more specific information.29 In others,
26. Van Driessche v. Ohio-Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848, 854 (S.D. Tex.
2006) (using term "equitable tolling"); see also Fumes, 362 F.3d at 723 ("We agree that
equitable tolling may apply to ICARA petitions for the return of a child where the
parent removing the child has secreted the child from the parent seeking return.");
Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 933, 946 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying the "tolling" doctrine "if
it is shown or demonstrated clearly enough that the action of an alleged wrongdoer
concealed the existence of the very act which initiates the running of the important time
period," but not deciding whether doctrine applied in Hague proceeding because
children were not well settled given efforts to conceal them); Belay v. Getachew, 272 F.
Supp. 553, 564 (D. Md. 2003) (determining the estoppel doctrine applies if "the
defendant engages in intentional misconduct to cause the plaintiff to miss the filing the
deadline" (citing C.M. English v. Pabst Brewery Co., 828 F.2d 1047 (4th Cir. 1987)));
Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (finding that the mother took "intentional and
significant steps to hide and conceal her and the children's whereabouts from
Petitioner"); Perez v. Garcia, 198 P.3d 539, 544-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (using term
"equitable tolling").
27. See Arguelles v. Vasquez (In re Hague Child Abduction), No. 08-2030-CM, 2008
U.S. WL 913325, at *10 (D. Kan. Mar. 17, 2008) (applying the doctrine of "equitable
tolling" even though mother enrolled the child in public school under the child's legal
name and the mother never changed her name); Van Driessche, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 850-
52 ("[A]lthough Smith did not actively conceal her whereabouts, she did not reveal to
Van Dreissche that she and Melissa were living in Houston.") (allowing "equitable
tolling" up to the point at which the father should have known location of child, but
granting mother's well-settled defense because she did not actively conceal the child, but
rather failed to tell the father where she was living, and criminal proceedings could
theoretically be initiated against her in the child's habitual residence); cf Wojcik v.
Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. 413, 420-21 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (rejecting "equitable tolling" in the
case because the mother called the father on the first day of the wrongful retention and
informed him where she was staying and the telephone number).
28. See, e.g., Garfield v.J.C. Nichols Real Estate, 57 F.3d 662, 666-67 (8th Cir. 1995)
(observing that silence by itself is generally insufficient to give rise to equitable
estoppel).
29. See, e.g., Dietz v. Dietz, No. 6:07-CV-1398, 2008 WL 4280030, at *18 (W.D. La.
Sept. 17, 2008) (tolling the one-year period until the mother learned of the children's
specific location even though the mother knew the children were in the United States,
and believed the children could be in any one of four states based on the father's work
and family connections), affd, No. 08-31003, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 23200 (5th Cir. Oct.
20, 2009); In re Hague Child Abduction Application, 2008 WL 913325, at *10 ("tolling"
the one-year period where the father did not learn of the likely location of his child until
a member of the mother's family informed him, despite diligent search efforts);
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the left-behind parent even knows the state and town in which
the child resides, but merely lacks information about the child's
specific address.30 Some of these cases even involve left-behind
parents who visited with their children in their new location,3' or
who knew early on the town in which their children were living,
but delayed an entire year to file the petition until after the
children's exact street address was known.3 2
Regardless of the level of "concealment" that triggers the
doctrine, courts rarely assess whether the concealment was
wrongful. Instead courts usually assume that concealment is
wrongful without further inquiry. Yet it is incorrect to
characterize all concealment as morally blameworthy, just as it is
factually erroneous to characterize all abductions as harmful to
children.33
For example, a number of cases exist where the abductor
claims to have fled for reasons of safety, and concealment might
have been a reasonable response to legitimate safety concerns. A
brief description of some of these cases illustrates that courts do
Giampaolo v. Erneta, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1281 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (involving a father
who knew the child was in the United States, but the mother refused to tell him the
precise location of the child and the mother and child changed residences several
times).
30. SeeJimenez v. Lozano, No. C05-5736, 2007 WL 527499, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Feb.
14, 2007) (applying the "tolling" principle during period when father was aware of
child's city of residence but unaware of his precise location); Bocquet v. Ouzid, 225 F.
Supp. 2d 1337, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (deciding to "toll" the one-year window until the
petitioning parent "confirmed [the child's] United States address"). But see
Muhlenkamp v. Blizzard, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1151-52 (E.D. Wash. 2007) (holding
that the mother's failure to provide father with address upon request was not the same
as "secreting away" the child and that "tolling" would therefore not be warranted);
Terron v. Ruff, No. 48683-7-I, 2003 WL 1521967, at *15-18 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 24,
2003) (refusing to apply "equitable tolling" when the petitioner knew the state in which
the child was located and there was no evidence that he was "hidden away to avoid
discovery").
31. See Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348 (applying "equitable tolling" even though
petitioner visited child in Florida on several occasions during the period that was
equitably "tolled").
32. Jimenez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10175, at *3-4, *9 (holding "equitable tolling"
applied when the left-behind parent did not find out the exact street address for over
one and a half years after the children's departure, even though the left-behind parent
knew in which town the children lived within two months of their removal, the petition
was filed one year after discovering the exact location, or two and one-half years after
their removal, and there was no indication the abductor affirmatively hid the children's
location, although she cut off communication).
33. See Merle H. Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic
Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 616-23 (2000).
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not typically inquire into the legitimacy of the concealment in
assessing the merits of an equitable estoppel argument. In Belay
v. Getachew, for instance, the court applied equitable estoppel
despite the fact that the mother left Sweden because of an
alleged history of abuse.3 4 The court summarily dismissed the
contention that the mother's actions might have been justified
because "looming over Respondent's decision was a history of
abuse."35 The court stated that "the Treaty makes no allowance
for 'self-help.' It is the apparent intention of the Treaty to
demand that parents rely upon the courts and the laws of the
local country (in this case Sweden) to resolve any disputes
between the parties."3 6 Turning to the equitable estoppel
argument, the court admitted that it had reservations about
whether the respondent had the intent to avoid a Hague
proceeding when she did not give the petitioner her contact
information, but the court lacked guidance on the issue and
concluded that concealment alone triggers equitable estoppel.37
34. 272 F. Supp.2d 553. In Belay, the mother wrongfully retained the child in the
United States in breach of the father's rights of custody. The mother moved into an
apartment with her brother and lived there for three years with the child. Id. at 556. She
never told the respondent the name of the city where she and the child were located or
gave him any contact information. Id. The mother's domestic violence allegations arose
in the context of the article 13(b) grave risk of harm defense. I. at 560. The court
acknowledged that the mother had presented evidence that she was the victim of
spousal abuse, but rejected the article 13(b) defense because the abuse was directed at
the mother, not the child, and because it "will never occur again" since the parents were
now divorced. Id,
Similarly, in Arguelles v. Vasquez (In re Hague Child Abduction), No. 08-2030-
CM, 2008 U.S. WL 913325 (D. Kan. Mar. 17, 2008), the abductor may have had good
reasons for concealing her whereabouts. According to the respondent, the father
threatened that he was "capable of killing" if the petitioner ever left him, frequently
drank to excess, was verbally abusive in front of the child ("T.A.G."), and physically
assaulted the respondent on one occasion. Id. at *2, *4. The court focused mainly on the
relationship between the father and child:
The record has clearly established that Petitioner has never hit T.A.G. or
physically harmed her in any way. Similarly, the record is also clear that
Petitioner has never verbally abused T.A.G. In fact, Respondent's own family
told police officers in Mexico that the child and Petitioner had a close and
loving relationship. Indeed, the fact that Ms. Gaspar allowed Petitioner
unsupervised lengthy visits with T.A.G., even after her own assault, speaks to
her lack of concern that Petitioner would hurt T.A.G.
Id. at *14.
35. Id. at 564.
36. Id.
37. Id. Outside the Hague context, the respondent's mental state is relevant to the
permissibility of equitable estoppel. See 4 AM. JUR. Trials § 30 (2009) ("It is a general
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A similar result was evident in Bocquet v. Ouzid, in which the
court applied equitable estoppel even though the father
"testified that he kept his location secret because he feared Ms.
Bocquet, who had previously threatened to buy a gun and to
have a friend of Ms. Bocquet's find him." 38 The mother
"admitted she had made a threat to shoot" the father.39 The
court took care to note that even though "Mr. Ouzid may have
believed he had reason to [conceal the location of his child]," it
nevertheless "does not change the fact that Ms. Bocquet was
deprived of her valid custody rights for over twenty-two months
by the very behavior the Convention seeks to prevent-'self-help'
or 'the law of grab and run." ' 40
An extreme example of a court's refusal to acknowledge that
alleged domestic abuse mightjustify concealment is Mendez Lynch
v. Mendez Lynch,41 a case that effectively penalized a mother for
her time in a domestic violence shelter. In Mendez Lynch, the
respondent alleged that the petitioner perpetrated various acts of
domestic violence against her.42 Part of the time during which
rule, however, that the defendant must have committed the pertinent acts with the
intention of inducing the plaintiff not to sue..."); see also Garfield v. J.C. Nichols Real
Estate, 57 F.3d 662, 666 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that equitable estoppel will not operate
unless the failure to file was "the consequence of either a deliberate design by the
employer or of actions that the employer should unmistakably have understood would
cause the employee to delay filing his charge."); Hoffman-Dombrowski v. Arlington Int'l
Racecourse Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (remarking of equitable
estoppel in the context of the statute of limitations for a Title VII claim that "[t]he
defendant's conduct must be aimed at accomplishing a delay in filing.").
38. 225 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
39. Id. The mother testified that she made this threat after the father "had
threatened to jump offa roof with [the child] and make them both 'ghosts.'" Id. at 1343
n.4.
40. Id. at 1348 (citing Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 401 n.13 (4th Cir. 2001)).
Bocquet's language on equitable estoppel was obiter because the court found that the
child was not well settled in the United States, having led a "mostly nomadic" life. Id. at
1349. Yet the case is frequently cited by others. Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723 (11th
Cir. 2004); Arguelles v. Vasquez (In re Hague Child Abduction), No. 08-2030-CM, 2008
U.S. WL 913325, at *9 n.38 (D. Kan. Mar. 17, 2008). The application of the equitable
estoppel doctrine in Bocquet is problematic, both in terms of what activity it required to
start the clock, see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text, and its failure to take into
account the reason for the father's refusal to reveal his exact whereabouts.
41. 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
42. Id. at 1355 ("Respondent testified that Petitioner slammed a door into her,
held her down, spit on her, placed his hands around her neck, pushed and 'smacked'
her, and threw things at her."). The petitioner denied that there was ever an incident
involving physical contact. Id&
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equitable estoppel operated was while the mother was at a
domestic violence shelter.43  The court mentioned rather
disapprovingly that the mother had stated her address was
"confidential" in her application for a domestic violence
restraining order and her divorce petition, 44 even though
revealing one's address when in shelter is often prohibited by law
or the shelter for reasons of safety.45
Sometimes equitable estoppel is applied even without a "bad
act" of the variety mentioned above. Several of these cases seem
to rest on the premise that relying on informal negotiations to
resolve the situation should not disadvantage a left-behind
parent. In one case, for example, the court thought that the one-
year clock should be "tolled" until a date set by the U.S. State
Department for reaching an amicable settlement.46 Similarly,
another court determined that the parties' informal
arrangements for the child to finish school in a particular place
delayed the onset of the one-year clock.4 7 Dicta in other cases
goes so far as to suggest that the "bad act" may merely be the
abduction itself.48 Yet the cases cited here are not typical, and the
remainder of the Article assumes that some level of concealment
is required to invoke equitable estoppel.
43. Id. at 1354.
44. Id. at 1355.
45. The policy of confidentiality for purposes of domestic abuse victims is clearly
supported by numerous laws at the state and federal levels. There are provisions to help
victims of domestic violence keep their addresses confidential, including exemptions
from public records acts, and provisions to keep shelter addresses confidential. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 10402(a) (2) (E) (2006) (requiring assurance from the governor of a state
receiving federal funds that procedures exist to ensure that a shelter's address will not
be disclosed absent permission from the individuals running the shelter); FLA. STAT. §
39.908 (2009) ("Information about the location of domestic violence centers and
facilities is confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1)."). See generally
Kristen M. Driskell, Note, Identity Confidentiality for Women Fleeing Domestic Violence, 20
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 129, 131 n.l1, 133-48 (2009) (outlining statutory schemes that
protect domestic abuse victims).
46. See Mendez-Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1363.
47. In re Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (among
other reasons).
48. In Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, the court said, "The passage of time should
not give advantage to the abductor who conceals the child or violates a court's order."
No. 06-cv-2548, 2007 WL 2071957, at *7 (N.D. Ohio July 13, 2007). However, the court
justified the application of equitable estoppel solely on the respondent's hiding of the
child and not merely on the respondent's violation of a court order. Id.
422 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 33:409
Another point of departure among courts that accept
equitable estoppel in Hague abduction cases is whether the
petitioner is required to diligently search for the child as a
precondition to the doctrine's successful invocation. Some courts
make this an explicit requirement, 49 but others never mention it
at all. For those courts that require diligence, the obligation
presumably stems from the equitable principle that a petitioner
must not have slept on his or her rights in order to be worthy of
equitable relief.50 The requirement presumably also advances the
policy of expediting the initiation of suits; it provides an incentive
to the petitioner to search for the child, and not just wait for the
respondent to emerge. Earlier litigation permits a more prompt
return of an abducted child, a Convention objective, 5' and also
allows the judiciary to resolve the controversy on the freshest
evidence possible.
No court has articulated what constitutes due diligence in
this context. Although one might imagine it should include
requiring the petitioner to contact the respondent's relatives,
coworkers, neighbors, and employers to discern the respondent's
location, 52 or, at a minimum, to contact persons who might know
49. See, e.g., Van Driessche v. Ohio-Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 2d 828, 850 (S.D. Tex.
2006) (determining that a petitioner's efforts to locate the child are a consideration in
the equitable calculus (citing Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 706, 708-09 (lth Cir. 2004));
Giampaolo v. Erneta, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1281 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (discussing and
finding sufficient the various efforts employed by the petitioner to locate his child prior
to filing); Terron v. Ruff, No. 48683-7-I, 2003 WL 1521967, *17-18 (Wash. Ct. App.
2003) (refusing to apply equitable "tolling" because the petitioner failed to present
evidence "that he diligently involved the services of governmental agencies in an
attempt to locate [his child] ").
50. See, e.g., Belay v. Getachew, 272 F. Supp. 2d 553, 564-65 (D. Md. 2003) (noting
that the case was not one "where a parent has 'slept' on his rights, allowing time to pass
without actively seeking the child"); see also Sullivan v. Portland & KR. Co., 94 U.S. 806,
811-12 (1876) ("'A court of equity... has always refused its aid to stale demands where
a party has slept upon his rights, and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can
call forth this court into activity but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence.
Where these are wanting, the court is passive, and does nothing."' (quoting Smith v.
Clay, (1767) 27 Eng. Rep. 419 (Ch.))); Williams v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, 484 F. Supp. 917, 920 (S.D. Fla. 1978) ("[E]quity aids only the
vigilant. Equity discourages delay in the enforcement of rights, as nothing but good
conscience, good faith, and diligence justify its action. It will not restore opportunities or
renew possibilities that have been lost by neglect, ignorance, or even want of means."
(quoting 12 FLAJUR. Equity § 66)).
51. See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
52. There are some requirements that have emerged in other contexts. See Fleming
v. State, 524 So. 2d 1146, 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the three-year
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the child's whereabouts and are listed on the form filed by the
petitioner with the Central Authority, 53 no court has articulated
what "due diligence" actually requires.
Without a set of objective criteria for determining due
diligence, a court's assessment of the matter is highly subjective. 54
For example, in one Hague case, the court found that a
petitioner's failure to do more than contact the local police was
insufficient to justify the application of equitable estoppel. 55 The
nature and history of the parties' relationship meant that the
petitioner should have known that the respondent would
probably relocate to the United States,5 6 and that he should have
made a more "concerted personal effort to find her."57 However,
in another case, the court determined that the petitioner acted
with due diligence even though he had a plane ticket indicating
statute of limitations barred prosecution for escape from prison because state gave no
evidence to prove that the four-year delay in serving appellant was reasonable, nor any
evidence that it had made a diligent search, or any search at all, to locate appellant); In
re Adoption of Leslie P., 604 N.W.2d 853, 857-58 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000) (commenting on
the failure to contact various relatives in a case involving whether to permit substituted
service); see also DAN E. McCONAUGHEY, GEORGIA DIVORCE, ALIMONY & CHILD CUSTODY
§ 2827:29 (2009-2010 ed.) (indicating that "[d]ue diligence," for purposes of an
affidavit for service by publication in Georgia, "means pursuing every reasonable
available channel of information such as the following: 1. Contacting neighbors at
defendant's last known address to obtain forwarding address. 2. Contacting last known
employer for forwarding address for [U.S. Internal Revenue Service] W-2 forms. 3.
Contacting family members of the defendant to obtain an address. 4. Contacting friends
of the defendant to obtain an address. 5. Contacting the post office for forwarding
address.").
53. The model form recommended at the time the Hague Abduction Convention
was promulgated asked specific information about the "place where the child is thought
to be," including "[o]ther persons who might be able to supply additional information
relating to the whereabouts of the child." S. EXEC. REP. No. 99-25, Annex at 2 (1986).
54. This is also true outside the Hague context. See, e.g., Dunahugh v. Envtl. Sys.
Co., 2 F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 1993) (deciding that the plaintiff could not use a state statute
permitting "tolling" of a breach of contract claim because his company had significant
contact with the defendant and even spoke with him on several occasions during the
period in which the defendant was claimed to be missing); People v. Landy, 510
N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (affirming the dismissal of an indictment for
bail jumping since the five-year statute of limitations could not be tolled; efforts to locate
the defendant lasted only six months, although efforts included the police visiting the
defendant's apparent residence, making several telephone calls to his mother and
former employers, asking the post office for a current address, and investigating whether
he held any licenses).
55. See Van Driessche v. Ohio-Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 2d 828, 850-51 (S.D. Tex.
2006).
56. Id. at 851.
57. Id.
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the new location of the mother and child and did not travel there
for four months, nor contact the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children ("NCMEC") to see if it had information on
the child's whereabouts, which it did.58  Another court
commended a petitioner's "ceaseless efforts" without specifying
whether this type of action was required. 59
A court also has discretion to determine whether the
petitioner waited too long to commence proceedings after the
petitioner discovered the child's whereabouts. 6° In some cases,
courts have applied equitable estoppel even though the
petitioner waited almost an entire year to file the petition.61 In
one case, equitable estoppel was used to delay the start of the
one-year clock for several days immediately after removal even
58. SeeBelayv. Getachew, 272 F. Supp 2d 553, 564 (D. Md. 2003).
59. See Fumes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 708 (11 th Cir. 2004). Specifically, the court
took note of the following proactive measures:
He first tried calling and writing to Reeves at her home in Bergen .... He
then contacted Reeves's landlord, who informed him that she had moved to
Oslo. Fumes then contacted the local post office and was informed that
Reeves's mail was being forwarded to her sister's address in Oslo. Later in the
fall of 2001, Fumes made numerous telephone calls to Reeves's sister in Oslo,
who promised to pass the messages on to Reeves. When Reeves failed to return
any of the calls, Fumes contacted Reeves's sister's husband at his place of
business and begged him to tell Plaintiff Fumes where Reeves was, but Reeves's
sister's husband denied any knowledge of Reeves's whereabouts.
On March 25, 2002, Plaintiff Fumes filed a police report at the Bergen
Police Station .... He was ultimately told by Norwegian authorities that
Defendant Reeves probably was not in Oslo and that there was little else they
could do to locate Reeves or Jessica. On March 27, 2002, Fumes filed a
petition for the return of his daughter with the Norwegian Ministry of Justice,
who helped Fumes in his attempts to locate his daughter. Plaintiff Fumes then
began searching for Reeves and Jessica in the United States. In August 2002,
Plaintiff Fumes traveled to Tampa, Florida and Atlanta, Georgia, where he had
been informed that Reeves might be living, to search for Reeves and Jessica.
Id.
60. For both equitable tolling and equitable estoppel, the plaintiff must file within
a reasonable time after learning the information necessary to file. See Doe v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield United of Wisc., 112 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1997) (equitable estoppel);
Campau v. Orchard Hills Psychiatric Ctr., 946 F. Supp. 507, 512 n.8 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(equitable tolling).
61. SeeJimenez v. Lozano, No. C05-5736, 2007 WL 527499, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Feb.
14, 2007) (involving a petitioner who learned the exact location of the child on Nov. 11,
2004, and filed a petition on Nov. 10, 2005); Giampaolo v. Emeta, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1269,
1281 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (indicating the petitioner learned the exact location of his child
on June 18, 2003, and filed a petition on May 18, 2004).
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though the petitioner then waited an entire year to file suit.62
Courts in these cases seem to ignore altogether the question of
whether equitable estoppel is appropriate given the petitioner's
delay. Courts apparently assume that a one-year period should be
permitted after the child's whereabouts becomes known since
petitioners typically have one year to commence proceedings and
thereby avoid an article 12(2) defense. However, it is highly
questionable whether a petitioner should necessarily enjoy a full
year to commence a case, especially when there is no other
obstacle to commencing it sooner, since the application of
equitable estoppel undercuts the article 12(2) defense and a
child's interest in stability.
While equitable estoppel commonly requires a
consideration of the respondent's bad act and the petitioner's
diligence, courts occasionally consider other factors. For
example, one court considered whether equitable estoppel
would undermine the well-settled defense in a case in which
return of the child would not achieve the status quo ante,63 a
purpose of the Hague Abduction Convention's remedy of return.
The court noted that the abductor would be prosecuted in the
habitual residence and criminal proceedings might deprive the
child of the abductor mother for up to five years. 64 As a result,
the father was precluded from arguing that the mother was
equitably estopped from asserting the well-settled defense. 65
The discussion so far has primarily focused on the doctrinal
variations that add uncertainty to the outcome in any particular
international child abduction case when equitable estoppel is an
issue. Of course, there is another reason why the doctrine adds
uncertainty to Hague adjudications. The application of equitable
62. See Perez v. Garcia, 198 P.3d 539, 544 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (using the
principle of equitable "tolling" to benefit the petitioner through Oct. 1, 2005, even
though removal occurred September 28, 2004, and the petition was filed September 28,
2005).
63. See Van Driessche v. Ohio-Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 2d 828, 852 (S.D. Tex.
2006).
64. Id.
65. Id.; cf. Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1363-64 (M.D.
Fla. 2002) (considering the promise of the father to dismiss any criminal proceeding
pending in Argentina against the mother for concealment of the children). Other
courts look at the possibility that the abductor will be criminally prosecuted and use it as
a reason to deny that the child is well settled. See Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 946 (11th
Cir. 1998); In reAhumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
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estoppel often turns on highly contested factual allegations. The
parties may dispute, for example, whether the respondent ever
revealed the child's whereabouts. 66
The notable variations in the doctrine and its application
suggest unpredictability in an area of law that otherwise prizes
uniformity.67 The variations may dissipate over time with
appellate review; alternatively, the inconsistencies may remain as
a necessary consequence of a flexible device. Regardless,
equitable estoppel currently adds a layer of uncertainty into
Hague Convention proceedings and will continue to do so for
the foreseeable future.
C. Justification for the Doctrine
The argument for equitable estoppel is quite simple: The
respondent's pernicious acts-such as hiding the child-should
not undermine the Convention's remedy of return by increasing
the likely success of a defense. Equitable estoppel is needed to
prevent a respondent from benefiting from his or her own
wrongdoing. This reasoning, or some variant of it, is the primary
justification that courts offer in support of the doctrine. 68 As the
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland stated,
66. See, e.g., Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 724 n.21 (11th Cir. 2004) (deferring to
the district court's determination of the credibility of the testimony regarding the
respondent's disclosure of the child's whereabouts).
67. See generally Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and
Progress: The Need for a Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 289-90 (2002) (arguing
that courts should try to maintain a uniform interpretation of the Convention, but
setting forth a framework that would permit deviation from the prevailing interpretation
when necessary to further the object and purpose of the Convention).
68. E.g., Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008); Fumes, 362 F.3d at
723; Dietz v. Dietz, No. 6:07-CV-1398, 2008 WL 4280030, at *16 (W.D. La. Sept. 17,
2008), affd, No. 08-31003, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 23200 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 2009);
Arguelles v. Vasquez (In re Hague Child Abduction), No. 08-2030-CM, 2008 U.S. WL
913325, at *9 (D. Kan. Mar. 17, 2008); Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 06-cv-2548,
2007 WL 2071957, at *7 (N.D. Ohio July 13, 2007); Van Driessche, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 848;
Gonzalez v. Nazor Lurashi, No. 04-1276, 2004 WL 1202729, at *11 (D. P.R. May 20,
2004); Giampaolo v. Erneta, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1281 (N.D. Ga. 2004); In reAhumada
Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Belay v. Getachew, 272 F. Supp. 2d
553,563 (D. Md. 2003); Mendez-Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1363; Perez v. Garcia, 198 P.3d
539, 544 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). It also supports the argument that courts have
discretion whether or not to grant the article 12(2) defense even if one year has passed
and the child is well settled.
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A rule that stated that a court considering a Hague petition
cannot return a child if the "abducting" parent has
established the elements of Article 12 would create a
perverse incentive for abducting parents. Such a rule would
inevitably result in scenarios where abducting parents,
hoping to avoid the mandates of the Convention, attempt to
conceal the child from the non-abducting parent for more
than one year. Then, if hailed [sic] into court on a Hague
petition (presuming the non-abducting parent could ever
locate the child), the abducting parent would have achieved
what amounts to an immunity from the Convention. The
purposes of the Convention would be directly controverted
were parents allowed to circumvent the Convention's
strictures by fleeing from the law.69
This rationale focuses on denying abductors the ability to
profit from their bad acts, and is similar to judicial reasoning on
other issues in Hague cases. For instance, courts are generally
hostile to abductors who argue that the child's return, and
consequent separation from the abductor, will cause the child a
grave risk of harm within the meaning of article 13(b) of the
Convention. 70 Courts point out that the need for return, and the
resulting separation from the abductor, were created by the
abduction itself, and an abductor should not benefit from a
situation created by the abduction.71
Courts provide a different justification for equitable tolling
than for equitable estoppel. Because equitable tolling is not
premised on the secreting of children, courts are not concerned
about rewarding that conduct by rejecting the doctrine. Rather,
courts tend to be concerned with basic notions of fairness. For
example, in Gonzalez v. Nazor-Lurashi,72 the court displayed
palpable sympathy for the petitioner who had diligently pursued
the return of her child. Tremendous delays in the processing of
69. Belay, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
70. See, e.g., Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 220 n.14 (1st Cir. 2000) ("we disregard
the arguments that grave risk of harm may be established by the mere fact that removal
would unsettle the children who have now settled in the United States."); Nunez-
Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the district
court was incorrect to consider the possible separation of the child from the abducting
parent in assessing whether return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm).
71. Walsh, F.3d at 220 n.14 (describing the separation of the child from the
abducting parent as "an inevitable consequence of removal").
72. No. 04-1276, 2004 WL 1202729, at *11 (D. P.R. May 20, 2004).
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the petitioner's case were apparently caused by NCMEC when it
was acting on behalf of the U.S. Central Authority.73 For some
reason, NCMEC apparently took no action on a petition after it
was contacted by the Argentine Central Authority.74 The court
held, in obiter, that the one-year clock was tolled on the day the
petitioner filed her petition with the Argentine Central Authority
and only began to run when that authority sent the petition to
NCMEC.75 This judicial maneuver made the petition timely.
Consequently, the well-settled defense was unavailable even
though the application was filed in court more than one year
after the child's wrongful retention.76
II. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES: AN INVENTION WITH LITTLE
BASIS
Neither the phrase "equitable estoppel" nor "equitable
tolling" is found in the text of the Hague Abduction Convention
or the U.S. implementing legislation.77 In fact, there is no
indication that the drafters of the treaty or ICARA wanted either
doctrine to apply. If anything, the evidence goes in the other
direction. This fact has not stopped courts from either inferring
the drafters' intent as supportive of the doctrine or adopting the
doctrine for reasons of policy.
A. Relying on Equitable Estoppel Despite the Convention's Silence
Some courts that apply equitable principles to the well-
settled defense claim that the principles are consistent with U.S.
congressional intent. For example, the Eleventh Circuit
remarked in the context of a child abduction case, "Unless
Congress states otherwise, equitable tolling should be read into
73. Id. at *12.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2002) ("There is
nothing in the language of the Hague Convention which suggests that the fact that the
child is settled in his or her new environment may not be considered if the petitioning
parent has a good reason for failing to file the petition within one year."); cf. Gonzalez v.
Nazor-Lurashi, No. 04-1276, 2004 WL 1202729, at *10-12 (D. P.R. May 20, 2004)
(recognizing that tolling is not in the Convention, but nevertheless applying the
principle to the facts of the case); Belay v. Getachew, 272 F. Supp. 553, 563 (D. Md.
2003) (acknowledging that estoppel is not in the Convention, but applying it anyway).
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every federal statute." 78 This conclusion was drawn from non-
Hague cases that discussed equitable principles in the context of
statutes of limitations. In fact, the language quoted above came
from a case discussing the Truth in Lending Act's statute of
limitations. 79
Congressional silence on the availability of equitable
estoppel in Hague Convention adjudications coupled with
language from a case discussing the statute of limitations for the
Truth in Lending Act is a thin basis for the Eleventh Circuit's
conclusion about congressional intent in Hague Convention
cases. Any such conclusion in the context of the Hague
Abduction Convention should rest upon a close examination of
that convention and ICARA. As the Second Circuit once said,
citing the U.S. Supreme Court, "In order to read an implied
equitable tolling provision into a statute that contains no such
express provision, '[w]e must determine ... whether equitable
tolling is consistent with Congress' intent in enacting' the
statutory scheme." 80 Such a statute-specific inquiry has led federal
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, to reject the
application of equitable principles in other areas, including areas
as to which Congress was silent.81
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States82 demonstrates the
importance of analyzing the underlying statutory scheme, even in
78. Fumes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Ellis v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 706 (11th Cir. 1998)); see also Lops v. Lops, 140
F.3d 927, 946 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that it would be hard to "conceive of a time
period arising by a federal statute that is so woodenly applied that it is not subject to
some tolling, interruption, or suspension").
79. Ellis, 160 F.3d at 705.
80. Acierno v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 77, 81 (2nd Cir. 2007) (quoting Bowen v. City of
New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986)). See also 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 115 (2008)
("Equitable tolling is only appropriate ... if it is consistent with the legislative
scheme.").
81. See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48-49, (1998) (rejecting equitable
tolling in a case involving the Quiet Title Act ("QTA") because "[e]quitable tolling is
not permissible where it is inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute" and "the
QTA, by providing that the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff
'knew or should have known of the claim of the United States,' has already effectively
allowed for equitable tolling" (citations omitted)); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991) (deciding that equitable tolling did not
apply to a federal securities claim because three-year limit was a statute of repose and
inconsistent with tolling).
82. 552 U.S. 130 (2008); see also Marley v. United States, 548 F.3d 1286, 1292 (9th
Cir. 2008) (concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b) was not subject to equitable tolling).
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the context of statutes of limitations. The case concerned
whether a lessor of a mine could bring an untimely suit against
the government for an unconstitutional taking. The government
waived any objection to the timeliness of the suit, but the Court
of Appeals had raised the issue sua sponte.83 The relevant statute
read: "Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal
Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition
thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues." 84
In agreeing that the suit was untimely, the U.S. Supreme Court
explained that statutes of limitations are divided into two groups:
those that seek to protect defendants against stale claims and
those that seek "not so much to protect a defendant's case-
specific interest in timeliness as to achieve a broader system-
related goal."85 A non-exclusive list provided by the Court
included "facilitating the administration of claims, limiting the
scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity, or
promoting judicial efficiency." 86 Justice Breyer, writing for the
majority, explained that the Court "has often read the time limits
of these statutes as more absolute, say as requiring a court to
decide a timeliness question despite a wavier, or as forbidding a
court to consider whether certain equitable considerations
warrant extending a limitations period."87
A similar result was reached in United States v. Brockamp.88
There the Court held that the statutory time limit imposed for
filing tax refund claims could not be tolled for equitable reasons,
even though the plaintiff missed the deadline due to mental
disabilities.89 The Court concluded that Congress did not intend
the tax statute to contain an implicit equitable tolling exception
because the statute set out explicit limitations in a highly detailed
manner, tax law typically does not take account of case-specific
equities, and the doctrine would cause administrative burdens
for the Internal Revenue Service. 90 John R. Sand and Brockamp
83. John R. Sand, 552 U.S. at 132.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006). The statute contained an exception: "A petition on
the claim of a person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim
accrues may be filed within three years after the disability ceases." Id.
85. John R. Sand, 552 U.S. at 133.
86. Id. (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 133-34.
88. 519 U.S. 347 (1996).
89. Id. at 348-49.
90. Id. at 350-53.
2010] UPROOTING CHILDREN IN THE NAME OFEQUITY 431
illustrate that it is important to discern whether the time limit has
a particular substantive purpose, whether congressional intent
can be determined from the legislative history or statutory
structure, and whether the importation of equitable doctrines
might have unfavorable repercussions.
Unfortunately, courts that apply equitable principles in
Hague abduction cases typically do not assess whether the
principles are consistent with the statutory scheme.91 Yet even
when an inquiry is made, courts have reached diametrically
opposite conclusions on Congress's intent by pointing to
different goals of the statutory scheme. In Duarte v. Bardales, for
example, the court held that equitable estoppel applied by
focusing on the "overarching intention of the Convention-
deterring child abduction."92 In contrast, in Anderson v. Acree, the
court held that the doctrine did not apply because the purpose
of the one-year deadline was to ensure that children were not
hastily uprooted once they were settled.93 Courts often do not try
to reconcile these Convention goals, although, as Part II.B below
suggests, it is possible to do so. A careful analysis of the
Convention and its foundational documents suggest that the
policy behind the article 12(2) defense trumps the general policy
of the Convention when the two are in conflict, a conclusion that
is contrary to that reached by at least one court that tried to
reconcile the two goals.94
91. See, e.g., Fumes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723-24 (l1th Cir. 2004) (accepting
equitable "tolling" without discussing whether it is consistent with statutory scheme even
though it was the first U.S. Court of Appeals to address the issue).
92. 526 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008). Yet the court also recognized the "serious
concerns with uprooting a child who is well-settled." Id. Its solution was to require
concealment as a prerequisite to the application of the doctrine. Id.; see also In re B. Del
C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a "tolling" argument when there
was no evidence that the abducting parent concealed the child).
93. 250 F. Supp. 2d 872, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (determining that the drafters of the
Convention "decided that after the passage of a year, it became a reasonable possibility
that the child could be harmed by its removal from an environment into which the child
had become settled, and that the court ought to be allowed to consider this factor in
making the decision whether to order the child's return"); cf Toren v. Toren, 26 F.
Supp. 2d 240, 244 (D. Mass. 1998), vac'd on other grounds, 191 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 1999)
(noting that, because the one-year time limit was intended to limit the further uprooting
of the child, the period starts on the date of wrongful retention, not the date on which
petitioner learns of or receives notice of the wrongful retention).
94. See In re B. del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1014 (deciding that equitable "tolling" is the
appropriate method to balance the Hague Convention's overarching goal of deterring
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1. The History Behind the One-Year Requirement
Whether equitable principles are consistent with or
antithetical to the Hague Convention regime requires a more
searching inquiry into the purpose of the article 12(2) well-
settled defense. The purpose of the defense, along with a full
reading of the defense's legislative history, suggest that
concealment was not meant to alter the one-year time frame set
forth in the defense.
Article 12 contains the well-settled defense. It states, in
relevant part:
Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained
in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement
of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative
authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a
period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the
wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall
order the return of the child forthwith.
The judicial or administrative authority, even where the
proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of
the period of one year referred to in the preceding
paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is
demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new
environment.95
This provision suggests that an analysis of whether a child is
well settled cannot begin unless the one-year prerequisite has
passed. On the other hand, there is no time beyond which return
is impossible. Even after one year has passed, a court "shall"
order the child's return unless the child is "now settled" in his or
her new location.
The well-settled defense was adopted, after considerable
discussion, to protect the abducted child from the harm that
might attend a repatriation following an abduction. A successful
defense means that the child will not be summarily returned to
the state of habitual residence and any custody contest will occur
in the abducted-to state. In that custody proceeding, a court may
still order the repatriation of the child, but only after examining
child abduction with the well-settled defense's goal of not uprooting a settled child
(citing Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008)).
95. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 12.
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all the evidence carefully. According to the Perez-Vera
Explanatory Report, which is considered an authoritative source
on the meaning of the Convention, 96 the defense was designed to
permit a more thorough examination of the evidence by a court
in the place where the child is located.97 After a child has become
settled in his or her new environment, "its return should take
place only after an examination of the merits of the custody
rights exercised over [the child] -something which is outside the
scope of the Convention."98
Article 12(2) reinforces the fact that the Convention is
designed to be an expeditious remedy. Senator Paul Simon, the
Senator who introduced ICARA, put it succinctly: "'Prompt
return' is the cornerstone of the convention .... -9 As several
English experts on the Convention have also noted, "[T] o return
a child after he has spent a considerable period away from his
country of habitual residence is very different from the classic
case of a summary return in the immediate aftermath of an
abduction." 100 These experts point out that the Convention
remedy "is designed to be one of hot pursuit," citing Lord Justice
Thorpe in the case of In re C (Abduction: Grave Risk of Psychological
Harm).101
The Convention's legislative history reveals that the drafters
did not envision exceptions to the application of the well-settled
defense. Specifically, the drafters did not propose a different
96. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 988 & n.3 (6th Cir. 2007) (referring to the
Perez-Vera Explanatory Report as the "official commentary on the Hague Convention").
Professor Perez-Vera, however, noted that there are inherent limits to the accuracy of
the report: "[I] t would be as well to remember that this Report was prepared at the end
of the Fourteenth Session, from the process-verbaux and the Reporter's notes. Thus it has
not been approved by the Conference, and it is possible that, despite the Rapportuer's
efforts to remain objective, certain passages reflect a viewpoint which is in part
subjective." Elisa PCrez-Vera, Rapport Explicatif [Explanatory Report], in 3 CONFPRENCE DE
LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV, ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZItME
SESSION, 6 Au 25 OCTOBRE, 1980: ENLVEMENT D'ENFANTS [HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, ACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION,
OCTOBER 6 TO 25, 1980: CHILD ABDUCTION] 426, 427-28 (1982) [hereinafter ACTES ET
DOCUMENTS].
97. See Pfrez-Vera, supra note 96, at 458.
98. Id. at 458.
99. 134 CONG. REc. 6485 (1988).
100. NIGEL LOWE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF CHILDREN: LAW PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 294-95 (2004).
101. Id. (citing In re C (Minors) (Abduction: Grave Risk of Psycological Harm),
[1999] EWCA (Civ) 771, (1999) 1 F.L.R. 1145 (Eng.)).
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approach when the abductor hid the child, id est, they did not
contemplate an approach that suspended the one-year clock
during concealment. The drafters certainly recognized that
abductors sometimes hide with their children as part of the
abduction, 10 2 but article 12(2) was provided as the complete
solution for that type of situation. This history is important to
recognize if courts are to achieve the proper interpretation of
article 12(2).103
Concealment was specifically rejected as a reason to stop the
accumulation of time if a year had passed since the wrongful
removal or retention. Initially, the Preliminary Draft Convention
proposed two time periods, depending upon whether the child
was hidden or not.10 4 The Preliminary Draft Convention required
that an authority return a child forthwith if a period of less than
six months elapsed from the date of the breach of custody rights,
but it contained a discovery rule when the child was hidden. 10 5
Yet the time gained through this discovery rule could not exceed
one year from the date of the abduction because the defense
would apply at the one year mark: " [W]here the residence of the
child was unknown, the period of six months referred to in the
previous paragraphs shall run from the date of the discovery of
the child, subject to the proviso that the total period shall not
exceed one year from the date of the breach."1 0 6 The time line
was reported as follows: " IT] he Special Commission adopted the
two time-limits which appear in article 11: in the case of the first,
102. See, e.g., Reponses des Gouvernements au Questionnaire [Replies of the Governments
to the Questionnaire] (Feb. 1979), in 3 AcTES ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 96, at 61, 88
(response of United States) ("There is a sixth problem which is becoming all too
common-the taking and concealment of a child by a parent before or after a custody
decree."); Observations des Gouvernments sur le Document Prliminaire No 6 [Comments of the
Governments on Preliminary Document No. 6] (Sept. 1980), in 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS,
supra note 96, at 215, 231-32 (comment of Canada) (calling the "classic" abduction case
one in which the child's place of refuge is not usually known at the time of the
abduction).
103. See Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 988 n.3 (6th Cir. 2007) ("When
interpreting a treaty, a court 'may look beyond the written words to the history of the
treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties."'
(quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985)).
104. Avant-projet de Convention Adoptif par la Commission Spdciale et Rapport de Mlle
Elisa Pgrez-Vera [Preliminary Draft Convention Adopted by the Special Commission and Report by
Elisa Prez-Vera] (May 1980), art. 11, in 3 AcTES ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 96, at 168.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 166, 168.
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of six months, the applicant knew where the child was; in the
case of the second, with a maximum period of one year, the
child's whereabouts were unknown." 107
The strict time line was important given the objective
behind the defense, an objective that remained unchanged
throughout the drafting sessions. Early on, Professor P6rez-Vera
explained, "Now we know that the time factor acquires an
overriding importance in cases of child removal. Indeed, the
psychological confusion a child may experience following such a
removal could reappear if a restitution order were adopted after
a certain time had elapsed."10 8 Therefore, as she said,
[if one examined the issue] from the point of view of the
child's interests, when the child is well integrated in his new
social environment, his return should not take place before
the custody rights have been examined on the merits-which
would fall outside the object of the Convention, which seek
to ensure an immediate return without prejudging the
custody on the merits. 109
Ultimately, the drafters settled on a single time frame of one
year for all cases, regardless of whether concealment was
involved. The single time frame had two benefits. First, it
eliminated the need to determine the date on which the left-
behind parent discovered, or should have discovered, the child's
location. Such an inquiry was thought to cause "considerable
difficulty."11 0 As Mr. Jones of the United Kingdom noted, "It was
possible ... that an applicant knew the country to which the
107. Elisa Perez-Vera, Rapport de la Commission Spdciale ltabli [Report of the Special
Commission], in 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 96, at 172, 202. At first, the Special
Commission proposed that a court return a child immediately if the left-behind parent
applied to a Central Authority within six months of a wrongful retention. See Conclusions
des Discussions de la Commission Speciale de Mars 1979 sur le Kidnapping Ligal [Conclusions
Drawn from the Discussions of the Special Commissions of March 1979 on Legal Kidnapping]
(June 1979), in 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 96, at 162, 163-64. This six-month
time limit applied "equally where the child has been abducted by stealth or force and
where the child has left his or her State of origin for a temporary visit or sojourn
elsewhere.. . ." Id. at 164. After six months, a court in the abducted-to state could
assume jurisdiction to address custody so long as the child was habitually resident for a
period of time, recommended to be one year, unless there was a need to protect the
child from serious physical danger. Id.
108. P(rez-Vera, supra note 107, at 177.
109. Id. at 172, 201.
110. Proces-verbal No 7 [Official Report No. 7], (Oct. 13, 1980), in 3 ACRES ET
DOCUMENTS, supra note 96 at 291 (comment of the United Kingdom).
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child had been abducted but not the child's precise location
therein."'11 Similarly, the representative from France thought a
single time period was preferable because it would "remove the
ambiguity from the point of the period provided" for by
"discovery."'1 2 The final Explanatory Report captured this
sentiment very well:
[T]he establishment of a single time-limit of one year
(putting on one side the difficulties encountered in
establishing the child's whereabouts) is a substantial
improvement on the system envisaged in article 11 of the
Preliminary Draft drawn up by the Special Commission. In
fact, the application of the Convention was thus clarified,
since the inherent difficulty in having to prove the existence
of those problems which can surround the locating of the
child was eliminated. 113
Second, the single time frame also had the advantage of
establishing a minimum period of time before a court could
consider the issue of whether the child was well settled. Professor
Perez-Vera noted in the final Explanatory Report that "the
difficulties encountered in any attempt to state this test of
'integration of the child' as an objective rule resulted in a time-
limit being fixed which, although perhaps arbitrary, nevertheless
proved to be the 'least bad' answer to the concerns which were
voiced in this regard."1 14 The single time period was adopted by a
definitive vote of twenty in favor and three against.115
There was considerable debate about the appropriate length
of the time frame,116 but ultimately the drafters settled upon one
year."17 The vote was definitive, although the United States was in
111. Id.
112. Id. (comment of France).
113. Pdrez-Vera, supra note 96, at 459.
114. Id. at 458.
115. See Proces-verbal No 7, supra note 110, at 292 (comment of Chairman).
116. Compare, e.g., Comments of the Governments on Preliminary Document No. 6, supra
note 102, at 216 (comment of the Federal Republic of Germany) (suggesting two years
might be more appropriate for an abductor committed to concealing the child's place
of abode), and id. at 231 (comment of Canada) (suggesting time limits in article 11
should be extended to twelve and eighteen months respectively), with Proces-verbal No 6
[Official Report No. 6] (Oct. 11, 1980), in 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 96, at 283,
288 (comment of the Netherlands) (suggesting that a short time limit of six months was
appropriate).
117. See Proces-verbal No 7, supra note 110, at 292 (comment of the Chairman).
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dissent.118 Before voting on whether one year was the length of
time at which the defense should kick in, the delegates were
repeatedly reminded that it might be very difficult to discover a
concealed child's whereabouts in a country as large as the United
States and that voting in favor of a one-year timeframe might
benefit an abductor. For example, the United States, in strongly
opposing the strict time lines, said,
As a practical matter, it may not be possible to locate a child
and to bring proceedings in an appropriate court within
these limits. This is particularly true in large federated States
such as the United States .... A statute of limitations of six
months from the date of the abduction to the institution of
legal proceedings, or a maximum of one year in the case of
the child's concealment, will cut off many deserving
applicants and their children. ... The United States urges
that at the very least one-year and two-year limits be
substituted for the present deadlines. 19
The United States again reiterated this point: "[T]he existing
time-limits established by article 11 [are] excessively
restrictive .... [1]t might prove impossible to locate a child
within a certain period of time."1 20 After the drafters decided
they wanted a single timeframe, the United States argued for a
minimum of eighteen months due to the "difficulty of locating a
child and the abductor."121
The United States' concerns were addressed, in part, by an
amendment that required a court to return the child after one
year if the child was not well settled. Therefore, the one-year
timeline would set a floor for whether a court could address
whether a child was well settled, 122 but it would not set a ceiling
on the time in which the court could return a child who was not
well settled. The Federal Republic of Germany proposed this
118. See id. (noting twenty-one votes in favor and four against).
119. Comments of the Governments on Preliminary Document No. 6, supra note 102, at
242 (comment of the United States).
120. Proces-verbal No 6, supra note 116, at 288 (comment of the United States).
121. Proces-verbal No 7, supra note 110, at 292 (comment of the United States).
122. See Perez-Vera, supra note 107, at 201. Setting a floor seemed wise for
administrative reasons: "Now, it does not seem possible to express the criterion of the
child's integration in an objective rule; therefore, the Special Commission opted for a
time period which will always be of an arbitrary nature but which may answer its worries
on that score in the 'least detrimental' possible way." Id.
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solution in Working Document No. 25.123 The proponent
explained that this provision was a "necessary compromise" and
would "help ensure its ratification by as many States as
possible. '" 124 The United States delegate, Miss Jamison M. Selby,
encouraged delegates to vote in favor of this provision because of
the practical difficulties of implementing an unmodified rule in
the United States, 125 and because the United States might not
otherwise join the Convention.126 Miss Selby clearly recognized
that a court would not be able to return a well-settled child, even
with the change afforded by Working Document No. 25.127 The
German proposal, after amendment, 128 was accepted by a vote of
fourteen to ten, with the United States casting a vote with the
majority. 129
In short, the drafters specifically addressed the tension
between the petitioner's need to find a hidden child and the
child's need for repose. Recognizing that sometimes it might
123. See Documents de Travail Nos 20 4 25 [Working Documents Nos. 20-25] (Oct. 10,
1980), in 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 96, at 274, 274 (proposal number 25 by the
Federal Republic of Germany) (allowing the judicial or administrative authorities to
return a child after the expiration of the relevant time frame "unless it is demonstrated
that the child is now settled in his new environment and his return would cause
excessive prejudice").
124. Proces-verbal No 7, supra note 110, at 295 (comment of the Federal Republic of
Germany).
125. See Proces-verbal No 10 [Official Report No. 10], (Oct. 18, 1980), in 3 ACTES ET
DOCUMENTS, supra note 96, at 312, 315 (comment of the United States) ("Miss Selby
(United States) thought that article 15's lack of clarity had been remedied by Working
Document No 25. She asked delegates to consider the United States situation, in which
the size of the country and the existence of 50 different judicial authorities could make
it very difficult firstly to find people who might constantly be moving around and
secondly to dispose of a matter once they had been founded, due to procedural delays.
She was worried that the one-year time-limit could be abused by certain people seeking
to avoid the application of the Convention.").
126. See Proces-verbal No 10, supra note 125, at 315 (comment of the United States)
("Miss Selby stressed that the United States delegation wanted other States to benefit
from American ratification of the Convention, and that the adoption of the proposal in
Working Document No 25 would facilitate its operation in the United States.").
127. See id. ("The basic principle must be made clear that a child should be
returned, and the proposed time-limit of two years, subject to the exception of the
child's assimilation into a new environment, was in her view a necessary clarification.").
128. The German proposal was amended to take out the words "during the period
of two years" and "and his return would cause excessive prejudice." Id. (comment of the
Federal Republic of Germany).
129. See Proces-verbal No 10, supra note 126, at 316 (comment of the Chairman).
The proposal to eliminate article 15 followed immediately thereafter, and was rejected
by a vote of ten to nine, with five countries abstaining. Id.
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take more than a year to find a child, the Convention mandates
the child's return even if proceedings are brought more than a
year after the abduction. In fact, a court "shall do so."'130 The
limitation, however, is that the child must not be "now settled in
its new environment." 131 Professor P6rez-Vera explained:
The second paragraph [of article 12] answered to the need,
felt strongly through the preliminary proceedings, to lessen
the consequences that would flow from the adoption of an
inflexible time-limit beyond which the provisions of the
Convention could not be invoked. The solution finally
adopted plainly extends the Convention's scope by
maintaining indefinitely a real obligation to return the child.
In any event, it cannot be denied that such an obligation
disappears whenever it can be shown that "the child is now
settled in its new environment." 132
As just discussed, the main component of the equitable
estoppel defense-consideration of the respondent's
concealment-was not supposed to alter the application of the
article 12 defense. It is likewise notable that the other component
of equitable estoppel, the petitioner's due diligence, also figured
into the debate over the well-settled defense and its
incorporation ultimately failed. Canada proposed on two
occasions that a petitioner's diligence be considered. For
example, in Working Document No. 73, Canada proposed the
following language: "For the purpose of this article [12], where
the applicant did not take any steps to seek the return of the
child within [six or twelve] months after the removal or
retention, it shall be presumed to have consented or acquiesced
to the removal or retention." 13 3 Canada's proposal was a specific
130. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 12(2).
131. Id.
132. Perez-Vera, supra note 96, at 459 (emphasis added). She continued,
The provision does not state how this fact is to be proved, but it would seem
logical to regard such a task as falling upon the abductor or upon the person
who opposes the return of the child, whilst at the same time preserving the
contingent discretionary power of internal authorities in this regard.
Id.; see also A.E. Anton, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 30 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 537, 549 (2009); Perez-Vera, supra note 96, at 458 (explaining that the
drafters rejected the possibility of an "extension of the time4imit" even though there
might be difficulty in locating the child).
133. Documents de Travail Nos 69 d 74 [Working Documents Nos. 69-74] (Oct. 22,
1980), in 3 AcTES ET DocuMENTs, supra note 96, at 348 (proposal number 73 by
Canada).
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response to Germany's proposal, in Working Document No. 25,
that a court should be able to return a child even after the expiry
of one year unless the child is well settled. The Canadian
delegate said:
That was so whatever might have been the conduct of the
applicant. The thrust of the new [Canadian] proposal was
whether the Convention wishes to reward indolence or
diligence. If the latter, then it should not allow the aggrieved
parent to sleep on his rights, to borrow a term from the new
law relating to laches, and should provide that where the
aggrieved parent takes no steps to remedy the situation, then
following the expiry of the period contained in square
brackets, the aggrieved parent should be presumed to have
acquiesced in the state of affairs. He suggested that the
proposal should be seen as an attempt to resolve one of the
difficulties left open by the adoption of the proposal of
Germany namely, that an abduction could be left hanging
for anything up to twelve years by the non-activity of the
aggrieved parent. He found that also to be a sobering
prospect.134
The Canadian recommendation.was ultimately withdrawn by
Canada after some pointed observations by other delegates. 135
For example, a representative from the United Kingdom noted,
The Convention already contained the ground of refusal that
the applicant had consented to or acquiesced in the removal
or detention. ... In addition, the question of what
constituted the steps to be taken raised the burdensome
problem of proof and opened up a scale of vagueness.
Furthermore, if the proposal were to be adopted, would that
imply that where some step had been taken there could be
no question of acquiescence? 13 6
The United States agreed with these observations. 13 7 Of
course, the criticisms leveled by the United Kingdom against the
Canadian proposal apply equally to the due diligence
134. Proces-verbal No 15 [Official Report No. 15] (Oct. 22, 1980), in 3 ACTES ET
DOCUMENTS, supra note 96, at 359 (comment of Canada). Canada was also concerned
about the petitioner's diligence earlier in the proceedings. See Working Doc. No. 40,
Proposal of the Canadian Delegation (Oct. 13, 1980), in 3 ACRES ET DOCUMENTS, supra
note 96, at 290.
135. Proces-verbalNo 15, supra note 134, at 360 (comment of Canada).
136. Id. at 359 (comment of the United Kingdom).
137. Id. (comment of the United States).
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requirement that is often now part of the equitable estoppel
analysis.
In sum, the legislative history of the Convention
demonstrates that delegates rejected proposals that would have
required judges to consider the respondent's concealment and
the petitioner's due diligence. This history suggests that an
equitable estoppel analysis is inappropriate in the context of
article 12.
The legislative history attending the passage of ICARA also
does not support the introduction of equitable principles when
an article 12(2) defense is raised. An examination of that history
shows the well-settled defense itself received little attention. 138
There was absolutely no discussion about whether equitable
principles might temper the defense.
The aforementioned legislative history of the Convention
and ICARA suggests that importing equitable principles into the
application of the well-settled defense is inconsistent with the
Convention. Since the defense exists to protect the child, not the
abductor, the time frame has a particular substantive purpose.
The framework is meant to apply even if concealment exits. The
court has the ability to return the child at anytime, even after one
year, but not if the child is well settled. When the child is well
settled, a court in the abducted-to nation should consider the
merits of the underlying dispute and only then determine
whether the child should be returned. A court adjudicating
return under the Convention, in contrast, is expected to return
the child quickly after the abduction.
Courts in the United States, whether they accept or reject
equitable tolling, have not addressed the legislative history of
article 12(2) in any depth. A number of courts have at least
recognized that the article 12 defense is unlike a statute of
138. There was some discussion about whether the article 12(2) defense would
raise issues typically addressed in a custody dispute and whether the federal courts
should have jurisdiction to resolve Hague cases. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. 6482-85 (1988)
(comments of Sens. Hatch & Dixon); International Child Abduction Act: Hearing on S. 134 7
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 67-68 (1988) (statement of Kevin R. Jones, U.S. Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.)
[hereinafter 1988 Senate ICARA Hearing]; International Child Abduction Act: Hearing on
H.R. 2673 and H.R. 3971 Before the H. Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 47-49 (1988) (statement of Stephen J.
Markam, U.S. Assistant Att'y Gen.) [hereinafter 1988 House ICARA Hearing].
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limitations because of the focus on the child. As one court
adjudicating a Hague petition noted, statutes of limitations are
about "repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a
plaintiffs opportunity for recovery and a defendant's potential
liabilities."'' 1 9 In contrast, the article 12 defense is about ensuring
the child's interest in stability is considered in the process of
adjudicating his or her return.140 The same court continued,
"Equitable estoppel, if accepted, would place the interests of the
petitioning parent above those of the potentially settled child
simply because the petitioner may have had good reason for
failing to file sooner."1 41 Equitable principles, the court
concluded, would be "inconsistent with the Convention's careful
balancing of interests." 142 Similarly, another court came to this
conclusion:
[T]his court is not convinced that the one-year period
referred to in Article 12 is a statute of limitations. A petition
for the return of a child is not barred if it is filed over one
year from the date of removal. Rather, the drafters of the
Hague Convention decided that after the passage of a year, it
became a reasonable possibility that the child could be
harmed by its removal from an environment into which the
child had become settled, and that the court ought to be
allowed to consider this factor in making the decision
whether to order the child's return. This potential of harm
to the child remains regardless of whether the petitioner has
a good reason for failing to file the petition sooner, such as
where the respondent has concealed the child's
whereabouts. There is nothing in the language of the Hague
Convention which suggests that the fact that the child is
settled in his or her new environment may not be considered
139. See Matovski v. Matovski, No. 06-cv-4259, 2007 WL 2600862, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 31, 2007) (citing Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 47 (2002)). Simply put, a
"second harmful disruption" might occur, making the return of the child presumptively
unwise after a certain point in time. In re Robinson, 983 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (D. Colo.
1997). For courts that cite the drafters' belief that a tribunal should consider the harm
that could result from removing a child after a year has lapsed, see, for example,
Blondin v. Dubois (Blondin I1), 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001); Nunez v. Ramirez, No. 07-
01205, 2008 WL 898658 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2008) (citing Matovski, 2007 WL 2600862); In
re Robinson, 983 F. Supp. at 1345.
140. See Matovski, 2007 WL 2600862, at *12 (citing Blondin II, 238 F.3d at 164).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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if the petitioning parent has good reason for failing to file
the petition within one year. 143
The conclusions reached by these authorities are correct
and should be followed by other courts.
2. Potential Authority Supporting the Adoption of the Doctrine
Although the Convention's travaux prparatoires and
ICARA's legislative history do not support the introduction of
equitable principles into Hague adjudications, other sources
might justify its adoption. Two sources come to mind: the official
interpretation of the Convention by the U.S. State Department 144
and foreign case law. While these sources should have less weight
than the relevant text and its legislative history, courts sometimes
do rely on these sources to support developments in Hague
Convention jurisprudence. Even so, neither of these sources
provides a solid basis for the invocation of equitable principles.
The State Department's legal analysis of the Convention has
been an important aid to the interpretation of ICARA for some
courts deciding other issues. 145 Some courts also cite to the State
Department's legal analysis as supporting an application of
equitable principles.1 46 The legal analysis says,
143. Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2002); see also Toren
v. Toren, 26 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244 (D. Mass. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 191 F.3d 23
(1st Cir. 1999) ("The language of the Convention is unambiguous, measuring the one-
year period from the 'date of the wrongful ... retention.' It might have provided that
the period should be measured from the date the offended-against party learned or had
notice of the wrongful retention, but it does not. That is not surprising, since the evident
import of the provisions is not so much to provide a potential plaintiff with a reasonable
time to assert any claims, as a statute of limitation does, but rather to put some limit on
the uprooting of a settled child." (citing Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1,art.
12)); In re Robinson, 983 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (D. Colo. 1997).
144. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis,
supra note 10.
145. See, e.g., Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1348 (llth Cir. 2008) (noting that
although the State Department's analysis is not binding, it is entitled to deference);
Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 373 n.7 (3d Cir. 2005) (indicating that State Department
interpretation should be given "great weight"); Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 14-19
(1st Cir. 2002) (relying on the State Department's legal analysis to decide whether
sexual abuse posed an "intolerable situation" under article 13(b)).
146. See, e.g., Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008); Arguelles v.
Vasquez (In re Hague Child Abduction), No. 08-2030-CM, 2008 U.S. WL 913325, No. 08-
2030, 2008 WL 913325, at *9 (D. Kan. Mar. 17, 2008); Bocquet v. Ouzid, 225 F. Supp. 2d
1337, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
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The reason for the passage of time, which may have made it
possible for the child to form ties to the new country, is also
relevant to the ultimate disposition for the return petition. If
the alleged wrongdoer concealed the child's whereabouts
from the custodian necessitating a long search for the child
and thereby delayed the commencement of a return
proceeding by the applicant, it is highly questionable
whether the respondent should be permitted to benefit from
such conduct absent strong countervailing considerations. 147
Courts should not give too much weight to this passage. If,
in fact, this excerpt supports the application of equitable
estoppel, it is at odds with the Convention itself. The State
Department may have included this language to encourage
judicial development of a position that the United States desired,
but was rejected during the drafting of the Convention.
Regardless of why this language was used, any interpretation of
the Convention that is inconsistent with the drafters' intent
would arguably put the United States in breach of its
international obligations, and should be avoided. 48
Moreover, courts need not read this passage as supporting
the application of equitable principles. While the quotation
seems to suggest that the parent who hides the child should not
benefit from his or her acts, there is an equivocation. The words
"highly questionable" suggest the issue is unresolved. In
addition, the admonition contains a caveat: "absent strong
countervailing considerations." This language implies that the
court should make a searching inquiry before returning a child, a
result inconsistent with the application of equitable estoppel
(equitable estoppel stops the accumulation of time so that the
one-year threshold is not met and an in-depth inquiry never
occurs). Therefore, the State Department's interpretation does
not support the application of equitable estoppel, but rather
supports making concealment relevant at a different place in the
analysis. Concealment might be relevant, for example, to a
court's interpretation and application of the words "now settled,"
as described below in Part 111,149 or to a court's decision to return
147. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis,
supra note 10, at 10,509.
148. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
149. See infra notes 337-39 and accompanying text.
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the child after a consideration of all the evidence related to
custody.
Foreign case law might also lay the foundation for a new
interpretation of the Convention by our courts. Congress stressed
that the Convention should have a uniform interpretation
worldwide. 150 Uniformity is, in fact, an important value in child
abduction jurisprudence. 151 In other contexts, U.S. courts cite
foreign authority when interpreting the Hague Convention. 15 2
The case law of U.S. treaty partners has not, however, been
the impetus for the acceptance of equitable principles by U.S.
courts. U.S. courts do not cite foreign authority on this matter. In
fact, foreign cases do not treat concealment as a factor that stops
the one-year threshold from being reached. The courts of some
of our treaty partners have even rejected equitable estoppel
outright. Rather foreign courts tend to treat concealment either
as a mitigating factor in determining whether the child is settled,
as a reason to refuse the defense once the child is found to be
well settled, or as altogether irrelevant to the defense's
application. Examples of these approaches follow.
In Cannon v. Cannon,153 the Court of Appeal of England and
Wales flatly rejected the "American doctrine of tolling." The
court found the American method "too crude an approach
which risks to produce results that offend what is still the pursuit
of a realistic Convention outcome." 154 Instead, the court found
concealment relevant to whether the child was well settled and
whether the court should exercise its discretion to return the
child notwithstanding the existence of the defense. 155
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3) (2006) ("Congress recognizes-(A) the
international character of the Convention; and (B) the need for uniform international
interpretation of the Convention.").
151. SeeWeiner, supra note 67, at 289-90 (explaining that a uniform interpretation
of the Convention is important if child abduction is to be deterred because abductors
would otherwise exploit divergent interpretations and engage in forum shopping).
152. See, e.g., Fumes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d. 702, 717-18 (11th Cir. 2004) (relying on
the interpretations of foreign courts in deciding whether a violation of a ne exeat clause
constitutes wrongful removal); Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (relying
on the opinions of foreign courts to decide proper analysis of habitual residence).
153. [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1330, (2005) 1 W.L.R. 32 (Eng.).
154. Id. at [51].
155. See id. at [6]-[9].
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The case involved a mother who abducted her child from
California to England in July 1999.156 For approximately four
years, she purposefully concealed the child by establishing new
identities for herself and the child. 157 That concealment was
relevant to the court's "broad and purposive construction of what
amounts to 'settled in its new environment."' 158 Construing the
Convention text in this way allowed a full consideration of the
facts of the case, "including the very important factor of
concealment or subterfuge that has caused or contributed to the
asserted delay." 159 The court acknowledged that concealment
comes in "many guises and degrees of turpitude." 160 The extent
of the wrongfulness is relevant to the emotional and physical
aspects of the child's life, both of which are components of
whether a child is settled.161
The ,appellate court also observed that article 18 gave the
trial court discretion to return the child even if the child was well
settled. 62 The court noted that returning the child might be
appropriate for cases of "manipulative delay," that is, delaying
the proceedings specifically to benefit from the twelve-month
limit.163 This holding was significant because an exercise of
discretion under the Convention gave primacy to the
Convention's objectives while an exercise of discretion under
England's domestic law gave primacy to the child's welfare. 164
This latter aspect of the Cannon decision-that a court has
discretion to return a child even after it is established that the
child is well settled-was reaffirmed by the House of Lords in the
case of In re M (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody).165 By a
four-to-one vote, the House of Lords held that the discretion to
return a child who was well settled existed under the
Convention. 66 Baroness Hale of Richmond mentioned that a
court should consider the general policy behind the Convention,
156. See id. at [5].
157. See id.
158. Id. at [53].
159. Id.
160. Id. at [54].
161. See id. at [56]-[58].
162. See id. at [62].-
163. Id. at [59].
164. See id. at [38].
165. [2007] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 A.C. 1288 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
166. See id. at [31].
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including deterring abduction, when exercising this discretion.1 67
However, she qualified this statement by also saying, "the further
away one gets from the speedy return envisaged by the
Convention, the less weighty those general Convention
considerations must be." 168 In the end, the House of Lords held
that the children in that case should not be returned because of
the father's and authorities' delay in instituting proceedings.
169
This was the outcome even though the case involved
concealment, as the mother had secreted the children for
"'many months."' 170 Baroness Hale concluded, "These children
should not be made to suffer for the sake of general deterrence
of the evil of child abduction worldwide."1 71
Similarly, in In re C (Abduction: Settlement) (No. 2),172 the court
found that concealment existed, but nonetheless exercised its
discretion to grant the defense. In re C was decided by the Family
Division in England after the Court of Appeal remanded the case
of Cannon v. Cannon, which is the same case discussed above,
although denominated differently. 73 To remind the reader,
there, a mother abducted her child from California to
England. 74 The mother then went into hiding with the child,
changing their names and date of birth. 75 It took five years for
the father to find them, at which point he instituted a Hague
proceeding. 76 The mother defended on the basis that the child
was well settled. 177
The trial court had no difficulty finding that the child was
well settled, physically, 78 emotionally,1 79 and psychologically.18 0
167. See id. at [46]-[47].
168. Id. [44].
169. Id. at [54]. The court noted that the father was to be blamed for taking a long
time to institute proceedings. It took him more than a year after he was notified by his
child to come and get them. The authorities then dragged their feet for eight months.
All the while the children "got on with making their lives here, where they are happy
and have become fully integrated in their local church and schools." Id. at [52].
170. Id. at [50] (quoting In re M (Children) (Abduction), [2007] EWCA (Civ) 992
at [121], (2007) 3 F.C.R. 564 (Eng.)).
171. Id. at [54].
172. (2005) 1 F.L.R. 938 (Fain. 2004) (Eng.).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 153-64.
174. (2005) 1 F.L.R. at 939 (Fam. 2004) (Eng.).
175. See id. at 942.
176. See id. at 939.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 941.
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Among other evidence, there was considerable proof from the
school, friends, and her church about how well the child was
doing.18' The court found "a clear and compelling picture of a
child who is happy, successful, stable, settled and flourishing to
an exceptional degree." 18 2 The judge deciding the case went so
far as to state that "I see no signs of withdrawal, reserve,
tentativeness or transience about [the child] 's life in Liverpool.
... I am entirely satisfied that she was and is settled in every sense
of the word." 83
Turning to the discretion it had to return a settled child, the
court noted in great detail the negative effects of not returning
the child, including the "most serious" fact that "the father
suffered the injustice of not being able to ask the court to
adjudicate upon the matter."18 4 Nonetheless, the court did not
return the child. It did not get into the merits of the mother's
departure, although it noted the words of Lord Justice Thorpe in
Cannon v. Cannon that "' [c] oncealment or subterfuge in
themselves have many guises and degrees of turpitude[, so] the
degree of wrong will vary from case to case."' 185 Rather, it found
that a return would be "extremely distressing for the child"
because stability was important for children and this child was
very well settled. 8 6 The court noted that "the time for swift and
summary return under the Convention" had passed. 87 Relevant
to this determination was that the mother had no means of
support in the United States, the father's offer of support was
unreliable, and the child could not live with the father. 88 The
Department of Children and Family Services had "serious
concerns if any child is placed under [the father's] care and
supervision," as the father had been convicted and sentenced to
prison for child cruelty with respect to two girls, ages five and
179. See id. at 945.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 942-44.
182. Id. at 945.
183. Id. at 946.
184. Id. at 948-49.
185. Id. at 947 (quoting Cannon v. Cannon, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1330 at [54],
(2005) 1 W.L.R. 32, 49 (Eng.)).
186. Id at 949.
187. Id. at 950.
188. See id. at 949.
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seven, who were his partner's daughters. 189 The court
acknowledged that the child was entitled "to look to the court for
justice."190 The child had spontaneously told a police officer that
she loved her life, did not want to leave, felt safe, and wondered
why they could not stay.' 91 The court was unpersuaded that
returning the child would have little effect on her in the end
because she would be allowed to live with her mother and then
relocate: it was uncertain whether the state of the child's habitual
residence would have an expeditious hearing or necessarily
permit the mother to relocate with the child. 92 Among other
things, the mother might be prosecuted for child abduction in
that jurisdiction. 193 In the end, the court was unwilling to return
the child to set an example for others who might abduct.194
The Supreme Court of Ireland examined the diligence of
the petitioner in exercising its discretion to return a well-settled
child. In In re R (A Minor) (No. 2),195 the mother took the children
abroad and the father claimed he did not know where they
went.196 The court emphasized that the father did not exercise
diligence in searching for the mother: "It is extraordinary that he
did not telephone her parents or attempt to do so to inquire of
her and [the child]. It is remarkable in the circumstances that
Interpol was asked to trace her-that neither the father or his
lawyers rang her home in Ireland." 97 In addition, the father
waited almost one year to start proceedings after the mother was
located. 198 This delay was apparently caused by his lawyers' need
to prepare documentation, but that was not an adequate reason
for the delay in the eyes of the court. 99 "Significant culpable
delay by a requesting party is contrary to the fundamental policy
of the Convention," regardless of whether the delay rises to the
level of acquiescence on part of the father.200 The child was
189. Id. at 946.
190. Id. at 950.
191. See id,
192. See id at 949.
193. See id, at 949-50.
194. See id, at 949.
195. [1999] IESC 32, [1999] 4 I.R. 185 (Ir.).
196. Id. at [10].
197. Id. at [37].
198. See id. at [38].
199. See id.
200. Id. at [48].
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permitted to remain in Ireland in the child's settled
environment.201
A different approach was evident in a case adjudicated in
Hong Kong. There the emphasis was on whether the children
were settled. The court did not address whether discretion exists
to deny the well-settled defense after it is established, but rather
found that the term "settled" is flexible enough to take account
of concealment. In AC v. PC (Abduction: Settlement),20 2 the court
specifically rejected U.S. authorities invoking equitable estoppel
and instead sided with English authority, even though the
children were hidden for almost five years. 20 3 The father in the
case had abducted the children from Australia and relocated
them to Hong Kong. He then took them to Mainland China 20 4
and later returned to Hong Kong without detection by
immigration officials on the lookout for him. 20 5 When he
removed the children, he took "active steps ... to keep the
children beyond the reach of any legal process [the mother] may
(in any practical sense) have been able to commence." 20 6 The
court stated, unequivocally,
[F]rom the time of their removal from Australia the father
has taken steps to physically locate the children beyond the
reach of the Convention and/or to conceal their
whereabouts from the mother. ... The father's policy of
concealment was pursued by him from the time he removed
the children from Australia on 16 August 1999 until the
commencement of proceedings in this matter on 17 May
2004.207
This included engaging in trickery to make the mother think the
children were in Taiwan, when they were not.20 8
201. See id at [51]-[52].
202. [2004] HKCFI 594, [2005] 2 H.K.C. 90, No. H.KM.P. 1238/2004, at [38]
(C.F.I.).
203. See id at [43] (rejecting the U.S. case Fumes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 (11th Cir.
2004) in favor of In re C (Abduction: Settlement) [2004] EWHC (Civ) 1245, [2005] 1
FLR 127 (Eng.)).
204. See id. at [17].
205. See id. at [20].
206. Id. at [23].
207. Id. at [30].
208. See id. at [24].
2010] UPROOTING CHILDREN IN THE NAME OFEQUITY 451
The court then concluded that the Perez-Vera report
supported the rejection of the "equitable tolling" doctrine. 20 9
The court stated,
[A]lthough largely unspoken, one of the principal objects of
the Convention is to secure the best interests of abducted
children rather than punishing those who abduct them. That
being the case, even if there has been morally reprehensible
conduct on the part of the abductor, a time must be reached
when, if the circumstances so dictate, it harms rather than
helps children to order their return. 21°
The court emphasized that the Convention's remedy of return
was meant to address abduction by "an early restoration of the
status quo which is achieved by ensuring the prompt return of
the child,"211 as is evident from the objects of the Convention in
article 1.212 That was not possible in this case so the well-settled
defense had to be considered, and equitable estoppel would be
inconsistent with that approach.213
The court then turned to the concept of "settlement" and
observed that concealment "is of direct (and perhaps overriding)
relevance to the factual question of whether a child has settled in
its new environment.... ,,21 4 Despite the father's actions, the
court noted that the children themselves had not been leading a
covert lifestyle since their return to Hong Kong.215 They attended
dance classes and rode the bus.21 6 In addition, there was no
chance that they would be deported, as they had a right of
residence in Hong Kong. 217
Other courts have similarly emphasized that concealment
can be addressed through an examination of whether the child is
"settled." For example, a 2000 Swiss case that was summarized on
the International Child Abduction Database ("INCADAT")
website, reached a similar conclusion. 218 The case involved a
209. See id. at [47].
210. Id. at [48].
211. Id. at [49].
212. Id. at [51].
213. See id. at [55].
214. Id. at [39].
215. See id. at [69].
216. See id. at [69]-[70].
217. See id. at [70].
218. See Justice de Paix du Cercle de Lausanne [Magistrate Court, District of
Lausanne, Vaud Canton], July 6, 2000, No. J 765 CIEV 112E (Switz.), available at
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mother who abducted her six-year-old child and was not
discovered for four years. Despite the length of time that had
passed, the court ordered the child's return. The child "had not
become settled in his new environment given the clandestine
nature of his existence over the previous 4 years, during which he
had not attended school, or developed any social
relationships. "219
A final approach to concealment is evident in the decision
of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in Secretary for Justice v.
HJ.220 The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the trial
court had residual discretion to return children after it
determined they were settled, "at least where the mother had not
manipulated the delay and her actions were of 'limited moral
gravity."' 221 The trial court had found that the article 12(2)
defense was established, but returned the children when the
mother could not satisfy the judge "that the father should have
known or discovered that the children were in New
Zealand .... "222 The trial court thought it would "undermine the
integrity of the Hague Convention ... if the mother were to
obtain an advantage by her own wrong-doing in not advising the
father she had taken the children to New Zealand." 223 The New
Zealand Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, explaining it
did not undermine the integrity of the Convention to apply the
defense. 224 The New Zealand Supreme Court affirmed. Once the
defense was established, then the decision to return "must be
determined principally in accordance with their welfare and best
interests," as required by the relevant statute governing
custody.225 Chief Justice Elias expressly rejected the suggestion
that a court should "balance" the objectives of the Convention
against the welfare and interests of the child.226 He explained, "I
see no conflict between the aims of the Convention and the
welfare and interests of the child once a ground to refuse return
http://www.incadat.com (follow "Case Law Search"; then search "Incadat Record
Number" for "434").
219. See id.
220. Sec'y forJustice v. HJ, [2006] NZSC 97, [2007] 2 N.Z.L.R. 289 (S.C.).
221. Id. at [1] (quoting HJ v. Sec'y forJustice, [2006] N.Z.F.L.R. 1005 (C.A.)).
222. Id. (citing Sec'y forJustice v. HJ, No. 372/02 (Apr. 15, 2004) (D.C.)).
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing HJ v. Sec'y forJustice, [2006] N.Z.F.L.R. 1005 (C.A.)).
225. Id. at [3].
226. Id.
2010] UPROOTING CHILDREN IN THE NAME OFEQUITY 453
is established."227 Simply, the New Zealand Supreme Court
discounted the significance of concealment by focusing on the
Convention's structure.
In sum, U.S. treaty partners have addressed the issue of
concealment in various ways. They have not, however, adopted
the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
III. THE POLICY BEHIND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL: DETERRING
THE HIDING OF CHILDREN
Although the use of equitable estoppel is neither supported
by the legislative history nor accepted by U.S. treaty partners,
courts are still drawn to it for an understandable reason. Courts
want to discourage the concealment of children. Courts assume
that concealment will be discouraged if they eliminate the legal
benefits associated with such behavior. For example, when the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accepted equitable
estoppel, it acknowledged that both the Convention and ICARA
were silent on the doctrine and that there were "serious concerns
with uprooting a child who is well settled regardless of whether
the abducting parent hid the child." 228 Nonetheless, it accepted
equitable estoppel because it felt compelled to "give significant
consideration to the overarching intention of the Convention-
deterring child abduction." 229 The court was worried that any
other ruling would "encourage hiding the child from the parent
seeking return."230
It is important to explore whether this justification has
enough merit to warrant the application of equitable estoppel
since this justification carries weight for so many courts.231 Would
the absence of equitable estoppel encourage the hiding of
children, or more particularly, abduction? Such a conclusion
rests on three assumptions, all of which are highly questionable.
First, it assumes that there are no other legal mechanisms that
discourage abduction and concealment, or that equitable
estoppel is particularly effective. Second, it assumes that the
Convention doesn't have other mechanisms by which courts can
227. Id.
228. Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
454 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 33:409
consider the concealment, or that a left-behind parent cannot
institute suit until the child's exact location is known. Third, it
assumes that deterring abduction is the be-all and end-all of the
Convention.
A. Provisions External to the Hague Convention that Deter the Hiding
of Children
If the Hague Convention were the only legal mechanism
designed to deter child abduction, it would perhaps be
appropriate to expect it to do considerable heavy lifting.
However, other legal devices also exist to discourage abduction.
Therefore, courts can stay focused on the intrinsic limits of the
Convention without fearing an abduction calamity.
Various legal provisions address abduction and, specifically,
the secreting of children during abduction. For example, all
states make child abduction a crime,232 and some make the
secreting of the child a more serious crime 233 or relevant to
sentencing. 234  Courts sometimes suspend the statutes of
limitations for the prosecution of criminal acts when the
whereabouts of the defendantis unknown. 23 5 At the federal level,
232. Kathi L. Grasso et al., The Criminal Justice System's Response to Parental Abduction,
Juv.JusT. BULL. (Office ofJuvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep'tJustice,
Wash., D.C.), Dec. 2001, at 1, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/
186160.pdf.
233. See Costlow v. State, 543 So. 2d 1259, 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(describing section 787.03 as a lesser included offense of section 787.04). Compare FLA.
STAT. §§ 787.03-04 (2008) (outlawing interference with custody), with § 787.04
(outlawing removal of minors from state or concealment of minors contrary to a state
agency order or court order).
234. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.6 (West 2008) (including as aggravating factors
whether the child was "taken, enticed away, kept, withheld, or concealed outside the
United States," or whether the abductor substantially altered the child's appearance or
name, or denied the child an appropriate education during the abduction ); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 565.150 (West 2008) (elevating from a misdemeanor to a felony the crime of
interference with custody if the child is concealed); Id. § 565.153 (increasing the felony
level depending on the length of time a child is concealed).
235. See People v. Seda, 712 N.E.2d 682 (N.Y. 1999) (tolling statutory period to
bring a criminal prosecution when the suspect's location was unknown despite
reasonable efforts to find him); cf. Ingram v. State, 703 P.2d 415 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985),
affd, 719 P.2d 265 (Alaska 1986) (refusing to rule that the State violated the 120-day
speedy trial rule when the defendant's whereabouts were unknown and the police
exercised due diligence in attempting to find him).
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international parental kidnapping is a crime,236 and concealment
might be relevant under federal sentencing guidelines. 237 In
addition, the secreting of a child is particularly relevant to the
torts of custodial interference and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.238 Concealment may also affect the statutes of
limitations in the tort context. Concealment is certainly also
relevant to any future custody dispute. 239 Finally, the fact of
236. See 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2006) (subjecting anyone who "removes a child from
the United States, or attempts to do so, or retains a child (who has been in the United
States) outside the United States with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental
rights" to a fine, three years imprisonment, or both).
237. Concealment would presumably be relevant to sentencing because a
conviction by itself authorizes a sentence up to the statutory maximum in an advisory
guidelines regime, United States v. Dallah, 192 Fed. App'x 725, 729 (10th Cir. 2006),
and concealment should be a factor justifying more time. Subject to certain
constitutional considerations, the court can consider the "conduct of a person"
convicted of an offense for purposes of imposing an appropriate sentence. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3661 (2006). In addition, the sentencing guidelines permit upward departures for
aggravating circumstances in child crimes, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5K2.0 (a)(1)(B), and other crimes, if those circumstances were of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006). Accordingly, concealment might
be an aggravating circumstance. See, e,g., United States v. Wise, 278 Fed. App'x 552, 566
(6th Cir. 2008) (approving upward departure in a case involving interstate travel for the
purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor when defendant took "overt
steps to keep her location a secret"). Admittedly, there may be constitutional issues
regarding enhancements since concealment is not part of the underlying criminal
offense. Cf United States v. Detwiler, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1168 (D. Or. 2004). Finally,
downward departures are sometimes offered during the plea bargaining stage for
returning the child. See Anna I. Sappone, Children as Pawns in their Parents' Fight for
Control: The Failure of the United States to Protect Against International Child Abduction, 21
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 129, 135 (2000). By implication, continued concealment of a
child should affect the willingness of the government to settle.
238. See, e.g., Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 339-40 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding facts
sufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress where the
mother left the state with the child and the father was unable to locate them until four
years later and evidence suggested the mother "engaged in a continuing and successful
effort" to destroy the relationship between the father and son); Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629
F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding award for intentional infliction of mental anguish
for the mother against the ex-husband's relatives who conspired to take and keep the
children out of state and concealed their location from the mother); Arthur v. Huschke,
25 Conn. L. Rptr. 401 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (granting prejudgment remedy for the
parent against the grandparent for aiding and abetting tort of custodial interference
and infliction of emotional distress for helping conceal the child's whereabouts); D & D
Fuller CATV Constr., Inc. v. Pact, 780 P.2d 520 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (in context of
personal jurisdiction, discussing the grandparents' alleged tortuous interference with
the parent-child relationship based on efforts to conceal the child from the mother).
239. See Catlin v. Catlin, 494 N.W.2d 581, 584-85 (N.D. 1992).
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concealment should be relevant to contempt for violation of a
custody order.24°
Fortunately, the Hague Convention is not the only legal
provision that helps prevent child abduction and the
concealment of children. The Convention could not adequately
deter abduction and concealment by itself. The number of
potential abductors who know about the Hague Convention, its
defenses, and particularly the judicially created doctrine of
equitable estoppel is undoubtedly miniscule. It is far more likely
that people know about the criminal law than a court-created
equitable device that only some U.S. courts accept. To the extent
that parents are generally aware of the Hague Convention, they
likely assume that the Convention prohibits concealment, even
without the equitable estoppel device, as "child abduction" has
that connotation. Even if a potential abductor somehow learns of
the specifics of the Hague Convention and the equitable estoppel
device, deterrence will depend upon his or her own assessment
of whether he or she can avoid the doctrine. A fully informed
potential abductor might not be discouraged from concealing a
child at all given the amount of discretion courts have to
determine whether and when equitable estoppel applies.
B. Provisions Internal to the Hague Convention that Deter the Hiding
of Children
It is also incorrect to assume that courts applying the Hague
Convention cannot already take concealment into account, even
without equitable estoppel. For example, courts have mentioned
the significance of concealment to an assessment of whether a
child's opinion should be heeded in applying the defense found
in article 13.241 In addition, courts also have considered
240. See, e.g., In re the Marriage of D'Attomo, 570 N.E.2d 796, 797 (1ll. App. Ct.
1991) (reciting that defendant was found in criminal contempt for absconding with son
and concealing him in Italy for more than two years).
241. Cf Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 06-CV-2548, 2007 WL 2344760, at *5
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2007) (refusing to give weight to thirteen-year-old's opinion when
his "generalized statements" suggested "his mother's influence ... biased [the child's]
opinion of Poland, particularly given [her] efforts to isolate [the child] from his father
and his earlier childhood"); Gonzalez v. Nazor-Lurashi, No. 04-1276, 2004 WL 1202729,
at *5 (D. P.R. May 20, 2004) (refusing to find a thirteen-year-old's opinion conclusive
because the "child has not seen Petitioner nor his sister in over 16 months even though
they occasionally communicate by telephone, e-mail and letters. Thus, we understand
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concealment when deciding whether a child is "settled." 242 These
provisions already provide disincentives to concealment.
There is another reason why equitable estoppel may not be
needed to deter concealment. If a petitioner can commence a
Hague proceeding even when the child's exact location is
unknown, then the timely commencement of the lawsuit itself
would defeat the application of the well-settled defense.
It is surprising that the respondent's amenability to suit has
not been an issue in the Hague cases that discuss equitable
estoppel. After all, courts adjudicating Hague petitions have
drawn upon case law discussing statutes of limitations and
equitable tolling. In cases involving statutes of limitations, courts
have held that tolling does not apply if the defendant is still
amenable to service despite his or her unknown location. 243 For
whatever reason, an analogous argument has not yet appeared in
the context of article 12(2), or at least it has not been captured
in the reported opinions.
This section now analyzes whether a petitioner can
successfully commence a Hague proceeding even when the
child's exact location is unknown. The following seventeen pages
of analysis could be its own article and perhaps should be. Yet the
discussion is included here because courts applying equitable
estoppel implicitly assume that a petitioner cannot file suit when
a child is hidden. If this assumption is false, then equitable
estoppel has no basis and should be avoided. In addition, the
analysis is relevant for courts that already accept equitable
estoppel. Those courts should be exploring the respondent's
amenability to suit as part of their inquiry into the petitioner's
due diligence.
The following analysis involves several layers. It starts with an
examination of the Convention to see what it says about where a
suit must be filed. It suggests that the words "where the child is"
mean only that the suit must be brought in the country in which
the child is located. Both ICARA and the law of civil procedure
the child has been heavily influenced by Respondent's wish for the child to remain in
Puerto Rico.").
242. See supra notes 153-83 and accompanying text; infra note 339 and
accompanying text.
243. See generally Kenneth J. Rampino, Tolling of Statute of Limitations During Absence
from State as Affected by Fact that Party Claiming Benefit of Limitations Remained Subject to
Service During Absence or Nonresidence, 55 A.L.R.3d 1158 (1974).
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indicate, however, that a court in the United States must have
subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue in
order to issue an order. As described below, these predicates can
exist even when the child's location is unknown. While a court
may conclude for policy reasons that it should not adjudicate a
Hague petition when the child is hidden, a court might also
reach a different conclusion for policy reasons if the respondent
is likely to receive actual notice of the proceeding. In addition, a
court applying equitable estoppel might be particularly inclined
to accept the argument that a petitioner can institute suit even
when the child is hidden because its decision will not actually
result in the adjudication of a hidden child. Rather, accepting
the argument will only mean that equitable estoppel should not
be applied, a result that is consistent with some courts' emphasis
on the importance of a petitioner's due diligence.
As preliminary matter, it is important to note that
"commencement of proceedings before the judicial or
administrative authority of the contracting state" in the United
States refers to a court, and not the Central Authority.244 It is
beyond the scope of this article to examine the merits of that
position.
The question addressed here is where proceedings must be
commenced. "Commencement of proceedings" clearly refers to
the "commencement of proceedings" in the country in which the
child is located. The Convention requires the "commencement
of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority
of the Contracting State where the child is."245 The reference to
"is" actually means where the child "is located." The Conference
initially decided to leave in the words "where the child is located"
over removing them altogether, 246 but then later took out the
word "located" simply because the word translated poorly into
French. 247 The drafters wanted proceedings brought where the
244. See, e.g., Wojcik v. Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (concluding
that the relevant article 12 period is the time between wrongful retention and
commencement of a civil action, and that the Convention specifically used the term
"administrative authorities" in a manner not to include the Central Authority).
245. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 12 (emphasis added).
246. Proces-verbal No 7, supra note 110, at 293 (comment of the Chairman)
(reporting a vote of fourteen against eliminating the words, six in favor, and five
abstentions).
247. Proces-verbal No 15, supra note 134, at 360-61 (comment of the Chairman).
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child "is" because otherwise the action might linger with no
practical ability to return the child.248
Yet the Convention does not specify anything more, and "is
located" can have various meanings: it can mean the town, state,
or country in which the child is located. The Convention does
not indicate where in a country the proceedings must be
brought. While the travaux pr~paratbires contains some comments
by delegates that suggest that a petitioner might be able to file a
petition in any court in the abducted-to country when the child is
hidden,249 other comments suggest that national law will define
specifically where the action must be brought.250
248. Mr. Dyer, the First Secretary of the Permanent Bureau, spoke of the
importance of an action being commenced in a court that could immediately enforce its
order. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom proposed eliminating "where the
child is located" since the child may have been removed to yet another country
unknown to the petitioner, and a return order might 'place pressure on the
kidnapper."' Working Document No. 33, in 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 96, at 282.
Mr. Dyer spoke against this proposal because it could affect the length of time an
application might be pending:
He felt that a dangerous situation would arise if a deprived parent could
continue an application indefinitely merely by filing an application in a State
of the child's habitual residence within the period of one year, since the whole
matter could thereby drag on for years. He was therefore in favour of retaining
the phrase "where the child is located."
Proces-verbal No 7, supra note 110, at 293 (comment of Mr. Dyer). A similar point was
made by the Netherlands' representative when he spoke against the elimination of a
reference to the child's location. Id. (comment of the Netherlands) ("[A]ny decision
obtained [in a state where the child was not located] ... might not be enforceable in the
State where the child was ultimately found.").
249. For instance, at least one delegate thought that the inability to locate the exact
whereabouts of a child in a country should not stop the filing of a Hague petition. The
representative from the United Kingdom was responding to Mr. Dyer's
recommendation that the text of Working Document 75 should read "where the child is
staying" instead of "where the child is located." Compare Proces-verbal No 15, supra note
134, at 360 (comment of Mr. Dyer) (expressing his dislike for the proposal to delete the
word "located," but recognizing the ambiguity inherent in the word and suggesting the
alternative "where the child is staying"), with Working Doc. No. 75, in 3 ACTES ET
DOCUMENTS, supra note 96, at 349 ("Where a child has been wrongfully removed or
retained in terms of article 3, and, at the date of the application to the judicial or
administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is located a period of less
than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the
authority shall order the return of the child forthwith." (emphasis added)). The
delegate from the United Kingdom called Mr. Dyer's proposal "positively undesirable."
Proces-verbal No 15, supra note 134, at 360 (comment of the United Kingdom). He
explained, "It was often the case that one knew that the child was within a particular
Contracting State without knowing exactly in that State where the child was to be
found." Id.
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The ambiguity created by the delegates' conflicting
comments alongside the Convention's silence might support an
argument that the commencement of suit in any court in the
abducted-to country should stop the one-year clock, even if the
court were not the proper court to adjudicate the matter. If true,
then the petitioner could stop the one-year clock at any time by
filing suit anywhere in the country and equitable estoppel would
be inappropriate.
That argument should not succeed, however, for policy
reasons, among others. The one-year clock should only be
stopped if the court before which the petition is filed can actually
adjudicate the Hague matter. Otherwise, time should continue to
accumulate because the child's situation will remain unresolved
and the child will continue to put down roots in the new
location. In fact, this understanding is consistent with the legal
analysis of the U.S. State Department, which emphasizes that "[a]
Yet too much should not be read into the United Kingdom's comment since the
delegate might not have understood that jurisdiction and venue could be obstacles in
the United States and there was no indication that the U.K delegate wanted the
Convention to override these local concepts. See 1988 Senate ICARA Hearing, supra note
138, at 27 (Testimony of Peter H. Pfund, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private
International Law, Department of State) ("Unlike other countries that negotiated the
Hague Convention, the United States has more than 50 different jurisdiction [sic], and
has parallel Federal and State court systems.").
250. The comments of other delegates suggested that the appropriate court in the
state where the child was located would have to be approached, as defined by national
law, for purposes of stopping the article 12 clock. The Netherlands' delegate, for
example, said:
The language contained no rules with regard to jurisdiction. While an
applicant could approach any judicial or administrative authority which had
jurisdiction, the Convention itself did not confer such jurisdiction, and it was
therefore not true that the applicant could seise any judicial or administrative
authority of the matter .... It was not the case that the deadline would be
complied with by an applicant approaching any authority within the twelve
month period, since an applicant was required to approach the correct
authority from which a decision was sought, within the time-limit.
Proces-verbal No 7, supra note 110, at 293 (comment of the Netherlands). These
comments were made in reaction to a recommendation of the Czechoslovakian delegate
to delete the reference to the child's location. The delegate suggested that such a
change would allow a proceeding to be commenced anywhere, "irrespective of whether
the child was located in that State or not." Id. at 292 (comment of Czechoslovakia)
(referring to Working Document No. 33). He continued, "The problem of searching for
the child would then not be a problem, since even after eleven months had elapsed, a
parent could send his application to another Contracting State and still bring himself
within the time-limit." Id. The Chairman also raised doubts about the Czechoslovakian
interpretation. Id. at 293 (comment of the Chairman).
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petition for return would be made directly to the appropriate court
in the Contracting State where the child is located." 251
There is the possibility, however, that a U.S. court other
than a court in the state where the child is located would be an
"appropriate" court to adjudicate the matter. An examination of
U.S. law related to jurisdiction leaves open this possibility. One
must start with ICARA, which specifies in which court a
petitioner must file a Hague petition. Section 11603(b) of the
Act indicates that a civil action is commenced "by filing [the]
petition for relief sought in any court which has jurisdiction of
such action and which is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in
the place where the child is located at the time the petition is
filed. "252
As explained below, ICARA can be read to permit a Hague
petition to be filed with any court that has subject matter and
personal jurisdiction, because then its order would be
enforceable in the state where the child is, once the child's
location becomes known. Admittedly such an argument is a bit of
a stretch. After all, the drafters of ICARA assumed jurisdiction
existed in a court where the child was located, and did not give
much thought to whether other courts might also have
jurisdiction.25 3
251. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis,
supra note 10, at 27 (emphasis added).
252. See42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (2006).
253. Telephone Interview with Linda Silberman (Oct. 19, 2009). Linda Silberman
was part of the Advisory Study Group Committee that drafted ICARA. This
understanding appears to have been grounded, at least in part, on a footnote in May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). The case held that Ohio did not have to give full faith
and credit to a Wisconsin custody decree when the Wisconsin court issued it in an ex
parte divorce action with no personal jurisdiction over the mother: "For the general rule
that in cases of the separation of parents, apart from any award of custody of the
children, the domicile of the children is that of the parent with whom they live and that
only the state of that domicile may award their custody." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528,
534 n.7 (1953) (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), §§ 32, 146, illus. 1-
2). Of course, the footnote in May does not resolve the question of whether additional
courts-apart from the one where the child is located-might also be able to adjudicate
the Hague petition. The passage addressed custody, not the provisional remedy of the
Hague, and the next footnote in May expressly noted a potential exception for an
abduction:
The instant case does not present the special considerations that arise where a
parent, with or without minor children, leaves ajurisdiction for the purpose of
escaping process or otherwise evading jurisdiction, and we do not have here
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While a court in the child's location would certainly have
jurisdiction under ICARA, ICARA does not say that court would
have exclusive jurisdiction. Section 11603 does not say the action
must be filed "where the child is located." If Congress had
wanted to limit jurisdiction and venue to courts in the state
where the child was located, it would have said so plainly. But it
did not. In fact, an earlier version of ICARA required that the
petition be filed where the child was located, but that language
was eventually changed to its current formulation. 254 Moreover,
since it was well known that parties sometimes hide children
within a country, it seems unlikely that Congress would restrict
the considerations that arise when children are unlawfully or surreptitiously
taken by one parent from the other.
Id. at 534 n.8.
254. For example, the relevant language of House Bill 2673 was the following:
Sec. 102. Administrative andJudicial Remedies
(a) The courts of the States, the District of Columbia, and the territories
and possessions of the United States, and the United States district courts shall
have concurrent original jurisdiction with regard to actions arising under the
Convention and this Act.
(b) Any person seeking judicial relief under the Convention and this Act
may commence a civil action by filing a petition in any court described in section (a)
within the jurisdiction of which a child is located at the time the petition is filed.
1988 House ICARA Hearing, supra note 138, at 6 (emphasis added). House Bill 3971,
which was considered at the same time, contained a slightly different formulation, but
the relevant language was similar:
Sec. 3.Judicial Remedies
(b) Petitions-Any person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the
Convention for the return of a child or for arrangements for organizing or
securing the effective exercise of rights of access may do so by commencing a civil
action by filing a petition for the relief sought in any court described in subsection (a)
within the jurisdiction of which a child is located at the time the petition is filed.
1988 House ICARA Hearing, supra note 138, at 18 (emphasis added). The Senate version
of the bill contained similar language too. See 1988 Senate ICARA Hearing, supra note
138, 6, § 102(b) (1988) ("Any person seeking judicial relief under the Convention and
this Act may commence a civil action by filing a petition in any court described in
subsection (1) within the jurisdiction of which a child is located at the time the petition
is filed."). The House Report on the bill described the legislation in slightly different
language, and perhaps was the beginning of the current formulation: "Petitions are to
be filed with the court which has jurisdiction where the child is located." H.R. REP. No.
100-525 (1988), at 11 ("Section 4(a) expressly provides that a person seeking relief
under the Convention has an original cause of action in any State court in the
jurisdiction of which the child is located at the time the petition is filed. The U.S.
District Courts shall have jurisdiction in cases arising under the Convention where the
jurisdiction exists under title 28, U.S.C. chapter 85. Section 4(b) provides for filing of
petitions to seek the return of a child under the Convention. Petitions are to be filed
with the court which has jurisdiction where the child is located.").
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the ability of petitioners in such cases to file a Convention
petition. The few courts that have suggested that the abducted
child must be in the state where the court sits have primarily
dealt with children who were not in the United States at the time
of filing.255 As discussed above, these holdings appear correct, yet
they do not resolve the issue of whether a court in the United
States can adjudicate the matter when the child is located in
another U.S. state.
A few courts have addressed the question of jurisdiction
when the child is in the United States, but not in the state in
which the court sits. These cases are inconclusive. 256 In Miller v.
Miller,257 for example, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's conclusion that the action had been filed within one year
of the abduction even though the action was commenced in a
jurisdiction where the child was not.258 The abduction occurred
on August 28, 1998, and the petition was initially submitted to
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York on
August 23, 1999, where other family court matters were already
pending.259 But "[t]he action was thereafter transferred to the
Western District of North Carolina, where venue properly lies. " 260
255. See Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the
district court, in prior litigation, dismissed the Hague petition because "the children
were not then within the Southern District," but rather in Greece); Espinoza v. Mattoon,
No. 09-0381, 2009 WL 1919297, at *1 (W.D. Wash. June 30, 2009) (stating that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case because "' [1]ocated' under ICARA does not require a
showing of residency, but contemplates the place where the abducted [child is]
discovered," but child was in Canada at the time of filing (quoting Lops v. Lops, 140
F.3d 927, 937 (11th Cir. 1998))); Sorenson v. Sorenson, No. 07-4720, 2008 WL 750531
(D. Minn. Mar. 19, 2008) (same, because child was in Australia at time of filing).
256. Other courts have made statements about jurisdiction, but none of them have
reached the issue as part of the holding or examined the precise issue being discussed
here. See Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 85 4 , 869 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) (remarking, without
resolving the issue, "Jeremiah probably could not have brought his Hague Convention
petition in California in the first instance because California probably does not have
jurisdiction to hear it."); Lops, 140 F.3d at 937 (holding that a Georgia court had
jurisdiction when children were discovered there, even if not resident there, because
"'[1] ocated' under ICARA does not require a showing of residency but contemplates the
place where the abducted children are discovered" (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b))).
257. 240 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2001).
258. See id. at 396.
259. See id. at 396-97.
260. Id. at 397 (indicating that a Hague Convention petition can be filed "'in any
court which has jurisdiction of such action and which is authorized to exercise its
jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the petition is filed"'
(quoting 42 § U.S.C. 11603(b) (2006))).
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The decision did not mention the date of transfer, but the
Fourth Circuit was clearly looking at the initial filing date of the
petition for purposes of the one-year clock and the child was
presumably not located in that place at that time. 261 In contrast,
in Lazaridis v. Lazaridis, the District Court for the District of
Delaware determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the
action when the petitioner put on no evidence that the child was
in Delaware. 262 The petitioner argued that jurisdiction was
proper because "the child was under the care of her father [the
petitioner] and his parents in Wilmington, Delaware at the time
of the filing of the petition" because a Michigan court had
granted the father temporary legal custody.263 The district court
dismissed the case and noted, "Petitioner's signature was not on
the petition or accompanying declaration," and he put on no
evidence showing the child was in Delaware at the time of
filing.264 Yet apparently the petitioner did not argue that
Delaware might have jurisdiction for other reasons.
Consequently, the legal question at issue here was not squarely
confronted.
ICARA can be read to confer jurisdiction on a court even if
the location of the abducted child is unknown so long as the
child is somewhere in the United States and the court has subject
matter and personal jurisdiction. First, the initial reference to
"jurisdiction" in section 11603(b) has no qualification. 265
Presumably "jurisdiction" has the same meaning as in other
federal statutes-subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction.266 In fact, at the time ICARA was crafted, the Second
Restatement on Conflict of Laws indicated that a child's presence
was not a prerequisite to a court's ability to decide the child's
261. See id. at 396 n.4.
262. No. 02-1681, 2003 WL 21056744 (D. Del. May 07, 2003).
263. Id. at*1.
264. Id.
265. See supra note 252 (a civil action is commenced "by filing [the] petition for
relief sought in any court which has jurisdiction of such action").
266. See, e.g., Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1264-66 (lth Cir. 1988)
(determining that the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which permitted suit in any court of
"competent jurisdiction," required both personal and subject matter jurisdiction). But
see, e.g., In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enter., Inc., Inv. Litig., 323 F. Supp. 2d 861 (S.D. Ohio
2004) (reading the language "a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction" from 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(c) (2) to mean "a state forum which has subject-matter jurisdiction, not one
which has both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction").
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custody. Under the Restatement, jurisdiction would exist when
"the controversy is between two or more persons who are
personally subject to the jurisdiction of the state." 267 Second, the
requirement that the court must be "authorized to exercise its
jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the
petition is filed"268 could mean that the court's order must be
enforceable where the child is found. This phrase would ensure
that prior to litigation the petitioner can establish that the child
is located somewhere in the United States, since a U.S. court
order is never guaranteed enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction.
Since the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution
makes a U.S. court order enforceable in other U.S. states when
the issuing court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction,
and notice was given, ICARA's requirement would not limit the
ability of U.S. courts to adjudicate the matter when the child is in
the United States, but the precise location of the child is
uncertain. This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the
framers that the action should be brought in the country where
the child "is." 269
Assuming that 'jurisdiction" in the first part of section
11603 means jurisdiction as it is commonly understood (subject
matter and personal jurisdiction), the question remains whether
a court can have subject matter and personal jurisdiction when a
child is hidden. The answer to that question is a qualified yes.
Subject matter jurisdiction is not an issue even when a child is
hidden in the United States: ICARA vests federal and state courts
with subject matter jurisdiction.2 70 Personal jurisdiction may exist
depending upon the respondent's or child's contacts with the
forum. 271 In litigation outside of the Hague Abduction
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971). This provision
gives a state the power to exercise judicial jurisdiction when either the child is domiciled
in the jurisdiction, the child is present in the jurisdiction, or "the controversy is between
two or more persons who are personally subject to the jurisdiction of the state."
268. See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (2006); supra note 252.
269. See supra notes 245-48.
270. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) ("The courts of the States and the United States district
courts shall have concurrent original jurisdiction of actions arising under the
Convention."); see also Abbott v. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 (W.D. Tex. 2007)
(referring to the second clause in § 11603(b) as a "venue" provision).
271. For purposes of the discussion, I am assuming that the court must have
personal jurisdiction over the respondent and not just the child. In many instances, the
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Convention context, personal jurisdiction can exist when a
respondent's location is unknown. 272 There is no reason to think
that Hague proceedings should be treated any differently so long
as an assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with the state's long-
arm statute273 and with the respondent's due process rights. Most
states have long-arm statutes that permit a court's jurisdiction to
reach as far as the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution
permits,274 so the principle inquiry will usually be whether the
respondent has sufficient minimum contacts with the state to
make the court's assertion of jurisdiction fair.275 While a more
generous alternative test might exist,276 this Article assumes that
contacts will be the same because the respondent will have passed through the
jurisdiction with the child, or the parent will have sent the child into the jurisdiction.
272. See, e.g., Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2005). When the respondent
defaults, "some courts have accorded plaintiffs greater flexibility in meeting their
burden of proving jurisdiction. This is so, such courts explain, because the defendant's
absence prevents the plaintiff from obtaining jurisdictional discovery." 102 AM. JUR. 3D
Proof of Facts § 20 (2005).
273. Since ICARA doesn't authorize nationwide service of process, "[p]ersonal
jurisdiction of a federal district court is coterminous with that of a court of general
jurisdiction of the state in which the district court sits." 28 FEDERAL PROCEDURE,
LAWYERS EDITION § 65:151 (2008) ("Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service
establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant: (A) who is subject to the jurisdiction
of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located." (citing
FED. R. CIv. P. 4(k) (1) (A))); see alsoJamelle C. Sharpe, Beyond Borders: Disassembling the
State-Based Model of Federal Forum Fairness, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 2897, 2922-23 (2009)
("Rule 4(k) (1) (A) directs that federal courts exercise the same personal jurisdiction as
do the state courts of general jurisdiction in which they are located, but it provides no
guidance on how to determine that jurisdiction. It thus requires resort to two external
legal sources: state long-arm statutes and judicial opinions construing the parameters of
state court personal jurisdiction and its Fourteenth Amendment due process limits. With
respect to the long-arm statutes, a minority of states limit the power of their trial courts
to serve process on out-of-state defendants to something less than the extent allowed by
Fourteenth Amendment due process. Accordingly, a court sitting in one of these states
must determine the manner in which the state legislature has statutorily limited its
reach. The majority of states, however, permit personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent
permitted by due process, which collapses the jurisdiction inquiry into the minimum
contacts test and its supporting analyses." (citations omitted)).
274. See Sharpe, supra note 273, at 2922-23. For examples of these statutes, see
ALASKA STAT. § 9.05.015 (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201 (1988); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-536 (1983).
275. See Merle H. Weiner, Half-Truths, Mistakes, and Embarrassments: The United
States Goes to the Fiflh Special Session to Review Operation of the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 221, 241.
276. It is beyond this Article to assess whether a federal district court might be able
to assert jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(K) (2) when the child and
respondent are in hiding, and whether that provision might afford a court even more
latitude in establishing personal jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(K) (2) ("Federal Claim
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the traditional minimum contacts test would apply and that it
could be met at times even though the child and abductor are in
hiding.
Sufficient minimum contacts between the state and the
respondent should exist if the respondent has been in or
through a particular state during the abduction.277 The assertion
of jurisdiction would be specific, not general, and therefore
should be easier to establish.278 Alternatively, the abductor may
have sufficient general contacts with a state such that it would be
fair to hale the abductor into court there, even if the abduction
itself is not connected to that state. General contacts might be
grounded in the respondent's and child's previous residence
there or the child's conception in the state. Any assessment of
"fair play" would depend upon a number of competing
concerns, including the national interest in addressing
international child abduction. 279
The second question is whether the petitioner can select a
court that is "authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place
where the child is located at the time the petition is filed" if the
child is hidden. If this is a venue provision, as ICARA's legislative
history suggests, 280 then it is not a restriction on the ability of a
Outside State-Court Jurisdiction. For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a
summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant
if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of general
jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States
Constitution and laws."). If this provision were used, a federal court might be more
inclined to look at the respondent's contacts with the United States, and not the
particular state, in assessing whether personal jurisdiction existed. SeeWeiner, supra note
275, at 241-42.
277. When a respondent travels with an abducted child through a state, the
respondent's contact with the state involves "purposeful availment of the benefits and
protections afforded by the forum's laws," United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274
F.3d 610, 621 (1st Cir. 2001), and "the respondent should expect, by virtue of the
benefits he receives, to be subject to the court's jurisdiction based on these contacts." Id.
at 623-24.
278. See id. at 623. See generally VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANsIus, 1 LITIGATION OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 1.4 (2007).
279. See Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., 104 F. Supp. 2d
279, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (" [W] hat is arbitrary requires consideration of the individual's
interest in fundamental fairness, the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
plaintiffs interest in obtaining effective and convenient relief, the judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the interest of
the forum in furthering substantive social policies.").
280. See 1988 House ICARA Hearing, supra note 138, at 38 (Statement of Peter H.
Pfund, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, Department of State, House
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court without venue to hear the action. Venue can be waived,28'
and if there is a reasonable possibility that the respondent
received notice of the action, then venue could, and should, be
deemed waived if the respondent does not appear in court. If, on
the other hand, the respondent appears and raises a meritorious
venue objection, the case can, and should, be transferred. 282
One could reasonably conclude that the venue provision is
not jurisdictional, 283 that is to say, it is not a requirement that
venue must lie in the court litigating the action.284 There are
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations) (discussing section 102(b) of HR 2673). Some courts also refer to this
provision as a venue provision. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir.
2001); Abbott v. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d 635, 636-37 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Ostevoll v.
Ostevoll, No. 99-961, 2000 WL 1611123, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2000); In reSuki, No.
95-6805, 1995 WL 631696, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1995). But see Holder v. Holder, 305
F.3d 854, 869 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that provision relates to jurisdiction); Lops
v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 937 n.Il (11th Cir. 1998) (same).
281. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006) (stating the well-
established rule that objections to venue are waived if not timely raised because venue
"is largely a matter of litigational convenience" (citing Heckler v. Ringer 466 U.S. 602,
638 n.25 (1984) (Stevens,J, concurring)).
282. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
283. Occasionally venue can be jurisdictional and mandatory. See, e.g., PETER N.
SWISHER, ET AL., VIRGINIA FAMILY LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE § 6:3 (3d ed. 2003)
(discussing a former statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-96B, that required a divorce action to
be brought in certain place, including where the plaintiff resided if the defendant's
whereabouts were unknown); see also Netzer v. Reynolds, 345 S.E.2d 291, 293-94 (Va.
1986) (discussing same statute). This statute was amended so that venue is no longer
jurisdictional and mandatory. See SWISHER ET AL., supra, § 6:3 n.24 (citing VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-261(19)).
284. Admittedly, this conclusion perhaps seems contrary to a statement made by
David W. Lloyd, General Counsel for the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children, during the ICARA congressional hearings. His testimony suggested that
litigation would be improper before the petitioner located the child:
The child would be retrieved once the child was located in a particular
jurisdiction. I mean, one would not want to file in 51 jurisdictions, either the
State courts plus the Federal courts for each jurisdiction. One would request
the assistance of the Central Authority in actually locating the child .... But
once the application would be made to that court the normal service of
process should certainly be attempted upon the respondent."
1988 House ICARA Hearing, supra note 138, at 111 (statement of David W. Lloyd, General
Counsel, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing and Exploited Children). Mr. Lloyd was not addressing
the specific question of whether venue could be waived when a parent was in hiding. In
addition, Peter Pfund and Senator Frank suggested that the petitioner could choose the
court and the respondent "wouldn't have any choice." They would be "stuck with it." See
id. at 113.
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numerous federal provisions that relate to venue,285 and these
venue provisions can typically be waived,286 just like venue
generally. 287 Waiver can even be implicit for a defendant who is
in hiding. As one commentator said in reference to a defendant
whose location was unknown, "the defendant himself has created
a situation in which it is impossible to know which forum is
convenient. The court could regard this as an effective waiver of
defendant's right to raise the issue."288 This seems particularly
appropriate when it is likely that the defendant will receive notice
of the action, so that the defendant could object to venue if he or
she only showed up to litigate.
In sum, whether a court can adjudicate the matter when the
child's location is unknown turns on whether the court has
285. See Meteoro Amusement Corp. v. Six Flags, 267 F. Supp. 2d 263, 267 (N.D.N.Y.
2003) (discussing the relationship of the venue provisions in 28 U.S.C § 1400(b) and 28
U.S.C § 1391 (c) for patent infringement cases); Quarles v. General Inv. & Dev. Co., 260
F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(f) (3) governs venue for
Title VII actions); Wellmark, Inc. v. Deguara, No. 4:02-CV-40534, 2003 WL 21254637, at
*2, *4 (S.D. Iowa May 28, 2003) (discussing how 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (3) provides venue
for actions under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act); Williams v. United
States, 932 F. Supp. 357, 363 (D.D.C. 1996) (warning of the significance of failing to
adhere to 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) for a malpractice claim against the government).
286. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430, 435 (1932)
(concluding that the privilege conferred upon defendants in patent cases by 28 U.S.C. §
1400 with respect to where suits may be maintained against them is a privilege that can
be waived); A.J. Taft Coal Co. v. Barnhart, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1301 (N.D. Ala. 2003)
(stating that a defense of improper venue is waived under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 when a
defendant files a responsive pleading or a rule 12 motion and fails to assert improper
venue (citing Lipofsky v. N.Y. State Workers Comp. Bd., 861 F.2d 1257, 1258 (11th Cir.
1988))).
287. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1) (specifying when the defenses of lack of
personal jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient process, and insufficient service of
process are waived); 4 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1063 (3d ed. 2009) ("But improper venue must be made the subject
of a timely motion by the defendant; in the absence of such a motion, the defense is
deemed waived and the original court may proceed to decide the case."). Typically
venue at the federal level is "statutory and judicially created, not constitutional, [and is]
designed to insure that litigation is lodged in a convenient forum and to protect the
defendant against the possibility that the plaintiff will select an arbitrary place in which
specifically to bring suit." Id.
288. Helen Garfield, The Transitoiy Divorce Action:Jurisdiction in the No-Fault Era, 58
TEX. L. REV. 501, 540 n.236 (1980) (discussing the appropriateness of forum non
conveniens when one state is better able to hear all aspects of an otherwise divisible
divorce); see also Heiss v. Nielsen, 132 F. Supp. 541, 544 (D. Neb. 1955) (noting "a defect
in venue is waived if the defendant entitled to urge it 'remains passive, neither
answering nor appearing, and suffers judgment by default'" (quoting Commercial Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Consol. Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177, 178 (1929))).
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subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and whether it is likely
that the respondent will receive notice of the action.289 If those
requirements are satisfied, then the respondent must raise the
issue of incorrect venue in a timely manner, otherwise the
objection is waived. Since an adjudication conducted in an
incorrect venue does not generally make a default judgment
void,290 courts need not concern themselves with the prospect of
relitigation such as when personal jurisdiction is lacking.
Therefore, the filing of a petition in a court with personal and
subject matter jurisdiction, but with questionable venue, could be
viewed as stopping the accumulation of time for purposes of the
article 12 clock so long as reasonable notice to the respondent is
given.291
Whether the respondent will likely receive notice of the
action depends upon the level of information a petitioner has
about the child's whereabouts and whether the petitioner has
ongoing communication with the respondent (or perhaps the
children). Notice is not an insurmountable obstacle when the
respondent is in hiding because ICARA includes methods of
notification aimed at absent respondents. ICARA says, "notice of
an action.., shall be given in accordance with the applicable law
governing notice in interstate child custody proceedings. '" 292 The
289. Section 205 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
indicates that a custody order is not entitled to interstate enforcement under the Act if
there has not been notice and an opportunity to be heard. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 205, 9 U.L.A. 676 (1999). The Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act also requires notice and an opportunity to be heard if a
custody determination is to receive full faith and credit. Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act of 1980 § 8(a), Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(e)
(2006)). While a return order is not technically a custody order, the requirements of
notice and opportunity to be heard also have constitutional roots. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V (procedural due process).
Improper venue does not appear to be a basis for refusing to give full faith and
credit to an out-of-state judgment. See Educ. Placement Serv. v. Wilson, 487 So.2d 1316,
1320 (Miss. 1986); Gibson v. Grupo de Ariel, LLC, No. 05-cv-415, 2006 WL 42369, at *2
n.6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2006). Typically, venue in a federal proceeding exists in a judicial
district where the respondent resides, or where a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or where the respondent is found if there is
no other place where the action could be brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) (2006).
290. See 46 AM.JUR. 2D Judgments § 240 (2006).
291. Allowing the commencement of proceedings in such a court to stop the
accumulation of time for purposes of triggering the article 12(2) defense is consistent
with the fact that filing an action in a court without venue still meets the statute of
limitations. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1962).
292. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(c) (2006).
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Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
("UCCJEA"), which almost all states have adopted, governs
notice in interstate child custody proceedings. Section 108 states,
in pertinent part, "Notice must be given in a manner reasonably
calculated to give actual notice but may be by publication if other
means are not effective." 293 This provision expressly permits
substituted service, and even by publication if necessary. 294
The UCCJEA's requirement that service be "reasonably
calculated to give actual notice" echoes the principle that notice
must be constitutionally sufficient.2 95 As the U.S. Supreme Court
said in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 29 6 the U.S.
Constitution requires "notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and to afford them an opportunity to present their
objections. '" 297 However, "if with due regard for the peculiarities
of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the
constitutional requirements are satisfied."298
The unique aspects of a Hague case, including an evasive
respondent, would be highly relevant to the type of notice
permitted. One type of notice that is becoming more common,
and that seems well suited to cases involving evasive respondents,
is service by email. Both state and federal courts have authorized
the use of email service, most typically when the defendant is
abroad and other methods have failed.2 99 For example, in Hollow
v. Hollow,300 the husband returned to Saudi Arabia, where he was
resident, in order to evade service of process for a divorce
293. See, e.g., UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT
[UCCJEA] § 108(a), 9 U.L.A. 652 (1999); see also, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518D.108
(2009); GA. CODE ANN., § 19-9-47 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW, § 9.5-107 (2004);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-146.7 (2001).
294. See UCCJEA § 108(a), 9 U.L.A. 652 (1999).
295. Id.
296. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
297. Id. at 314-15.
298. Id.
299. See, e.g., Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016-19 (9th Cir.
2002); Williams v. Adver. Sex LLC., 231 F.RD. 483, 487-88 (N.D. W. Va. 2005); Popular
Enters., LLC v. Webcom Media Group, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 560, 562-63 (E.D. Tenn. 2004);
In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 718-20 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000). See
generally Service of Process Via Computer or Fax, 30 A.L.R. 6th 413 (2008) (summarizing the
state of the law regarding service by electronic media).
300. 747 N.Y.S.2d 704 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
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action.30 1 The court permitted service by email because the
husband had "secreted himself behind a steel door, bolted shut,
communicating with the plaintiff and his children exclusively
through e-mail." 302 Email service has also been used for evasive
defendants who remain in the United States.30 3 This avenue, and
also notice though social networking sites such as Facebook, 04
may be appropriate in these sorts of Hague cases. After all, it is
not unusual for the petitioner and respondent to be in
communication through email, even when the respondent is in
hiding and the children's whereabouts are unknown. 30 5
Less ideal, although still acceptable under the UCCJEA and
the U.S. Constitution, is publication notice. Although insufficient
when a respondent's location is known, publication notice can be
constitutionally sufficient when the respondent's location is
unknown. 306 As one commentator noted,
The real test for determining if means of notice giving other
than personal service or its equivalent will suffice is whether
the method is reasonably calculated to give actual notice
and, when there is some doubt on that point, the question
becomes whether it is at least the best possible procedure
available under the circumstances. 30
7
301. See id at 692.
302. Id. at 708.
303. See Snyder v. Alternate Energy, 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 449 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., 2008)
(citing Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017).
304. "[TIhe New Zealand High Court allowed a man to be served with process in a
case involving failed business dealings. The New Zealand plaintiffs lawyer argued that
the defendant's exact whereabouts were unknown, but demonstrated that the defendant
maintained a social presence on Facebook." See Nick S. Pujji et al., Facebook: The
Future of Service of Process?, http://www.dlapiper.com/
facebook-the-future-of-service-of-process/ (Apr. 8, 2009) (citing Ian Llewellyn, NZ Court
Papers Can Be Served Via Facebook, Judge Rules, N.Z. HERALD, Mar. 16, 2009,
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c id=l&objectid=10561970).
305. See, e.g., Muhlenkamp v. Blizzard, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (E.D. Wash. 2007);
Van Driessche v. Ohio-Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 2d 828 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Mendez Lynch
v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
306. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the Court rejected the
sufficiency of publication notice for trust beneficiaries whose addresses where known by
the trustee, but found it sufficient for unknown beneficiaries or contingent beneficiaries
whose whereabouts were unknown. 399 U.S. 306, 317-18 (1950); see Tulsa Prof'l
Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v.
Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
307. 4A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 287, § 1074.
2010] UPROOTING CHILDREN IN THE NAME OFEQUITY
Courts have used notice by publication in custody
modification actions that involve a parent who has absconded
with the child, and it may be equally appropriate in some Hague
cases when a respondent is in hiding.3 8 When the petitioner has
some reasonable basis for suspecting that a respondent is in a
particular state or, even better, a town, then publication notice
seems acceptable because there is a likelihood that the
respondent will get actual notice.
As the above discussion demonstrates, a petitioner does not
necessarily need to know the exact location of the child in order
to institute suit.3 0 9 Courts, nonetheless, have applied equitable
estoppel to situations in which the petitioner could have
instituted suit. For example, in Mendez Lynch, the mother had left
Argentina with the children on January 19, 2000, and the father
knew the children were in Florida since February 2000.310 The
mother inadvertently confirmed the location of the children in a
March 7, 2000, email.3 11 On June 19, 2000, the mother gave the
father her Fort Myers post office address. 312 Nonetheless, the
court applied equitable "tolling," and said that the doctrine
precluded the start of the one-year clock until either July 6, 2000
or November 6, 2000.313 The former was a set date by the U.S.
Central Authority to try to resolve the case without resort to
litigation, and the later was the date the mother took the father
to her house to see the children.314 Yet, well before those dates,
the father knew that the mother was in Florida, and even the
town in which she resided with the children.3 15 He had enough
308. See Bays v. Bays, 489 N.E.2d 555, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming trial
court's refusal to set aside default on motion to modify custody after publication notice).
309. See id. at 559-60.
310. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1353.
311. See id.
312. See id. at 1354.
313. Id. at 1363.
314. See id.
315. Interestingly, the court implicitly seems to recognize that a person's exact
location need not be known in order to institute suit. After all, the court entertained the
earlier July 6 date as a possible date by which the estoppel would end even though the
father did not know the mother's exact location until November. Although the court
talks about the policy of resolving disputes amicably, I am assuming that the court was
not suggesting that outstanding offers to settle a dispute toll the well-settled defense. Not
only would such a position be without a foundation in the Convention, but such a
position is certainly inconsistent with how statutes of limitations work generally. No
attorney would ever put off filing a lawsuit to meet the statute of limitations merely
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information to make it likely that she would receive notice of a
Hague proceeding.
Admittedly, it is unclear whether it is good policy to
interpret ICARA to permit the commencement of proceedings
when the child is in hiding (or to amend ICARA to make such an
option explicit, or perhaps to make it available, if it is not
presently). On the one hand, it seems like a good solution for
situations where the abductor is likely to get notice of the action.
After all, these cases will come before the courts more quickly
and respondents that receive notice may, in fact, participate in
those proceedings. Even if a respondent does not participate, the
existence of a judgment will expedite the return of the child
once the child is found. Permitting the commencement of
proceedings in a court with jurisdiction over the respondent
saves petitioners the time and money involved in chasing their
children around the United States.
On the other hand, allowing an action to be brought when
the child's location is unknown may make it more likely that
courts will enter a return order by default, something that was
probably never contemplated by the Convention's drafters and
something that seems unwise given that so many of the defenses
specifically further the child's interests. 316 In addition, this
approach would rest the United States' treaty compliance upon
state notions ofjurisdiction.
These particular drawbacks should not, however, inhibit a
court from accepting the analysis when applying equitable
estoppel. After all, a determination that a U.S. court could have
adjudicated the suit sooner would not actually require any court
to adjudicate the Hague petition of a missing child. The inquiry
here is solely for purposes of applying the Hague Convention to a
child who is now before the court. If the petitioner could have
commenced a proceeding before the child's location became
because the parties were negotiating. See Crumpton v. Humana, Inc., 661 P.2d 54 (N.M.
1983) (holding that it was "entirely without merit" to think that the statute of limitations
would be tolled while the parties were negotiating). There is also no indication in the
record that Ms. Mendez Lynch said anything that would establish a basis for tolling in
this context, such as misrepresenting that she would settle the dispute if Mr. Mendez
Lynch did not file the lawsuit.
316. See, e.g., Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 13(b) (return would
raise a grave risk to the child's physical or psychological well-being); id. art. 13 (return
would impinge on the child's autonomy given the child's age and maturity).
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known, then the court should find that the petitioner did not
exercise due diligence, a prerequisite to the application of
equitable estoppel. In short, acceptance of the preceding
jurisdictional analysis in this context only means that the
respondent would be able to invoke article 12(2) for the settled
child and the child would have all of the evidence relating to his
or her custody heard prior to being returned.
Alternatively, a court could avoid fretting about the
jurisdictional rules by simply rejecting equitable estoppel
outright.
C. Limits to Deterring Abduction and Concealment
Although the purpose of the Hague Abduction Convention
is to discourage abduction by returning abducted children,
discouraging abduction is not the be-all and end-all of the
Convention. The Convention's remedy of return is set within a
broader framework and that framework proves that abduction
should not be deterred at all costs. After all, there are five
defenses. These defenses recognize, among other things, the
importance of the child's views,3 17 the child's physical and
psychological health,318 and international human rights. 319
In addition, courts have never made the deterrence of
abduction the sole touchstone for the interpretation of other
core Convention concepts. The way that courts interpret the
concept of "habitual residence" provides a useful example. If
deterring abduction were the sole determinant for the correct
analysis, then courts would say that a child's habitual residence
could never change absent the agreement of both parents. Yet
some courts disregard the parents' intentions and look only at
whether the child has a settled purpose in the particular place.
320
Even the Ninth Circuit in Mozes v. Mozes,321 which represents the
majority approach to determining habitual residence in the
317. See id.
318. See id. art. 13(b).
319. See id. art. 20.
320. See, e.g., Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 993 (6th Cir. 2007); Tai
Vivatvaraphol, Note, Back to Basics: Determining a Child's Habitual Residence in International
Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 3325, 3358-60
(2009) (citing foreign cases from civil law countries that take this approach).
321. Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).
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United States, 322 acknowledges that the parents' intent is not
always determinative. Although Mozes makes parental intent
crucial to a determination of the child's habitual residence in
most cases,323 a child's habitual residence can still shift absent
parental agreement if the child has become acclimatized to a
place. 324
Other courts appropriately have held that the goal of
discouraging abduction cannot justify an incorrect interpretation
or application of the Convention. In Ohlander v. Larson, for
example, a father executed a "grab and run" and took his
daughter from Sweden to the United States without the mother's
consent.3 25 The mother filed a Hague proceeding in the United
States, and the court entered an order prohibiting the child's
removal from the jurisdiction pending further order.3 26
Nonetheless, the mother grabbed her child and fled to Sweden,
in blatant defiance of the court's order. 327 The court ordered that
the mother return the child to the United States, but she refused
to comply.328 When the mother moved the U.S. court to dismiss
her petition pursuant to rule 41(a) (2), the U.S. court refused to
dismiss her action as punishment for the contempt.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit declared that it would not
"condone a court ignoring its duty to consider the merits of a
motion to dismiss simply because a party has violated its
orders."3 29  Among other things, it found the proper
interpretation of the Hague Convention more important than
punishing the mother's abduction. After all, the court was to
adjudicate the respondent's removal, not the petitioner's, 330 and
the court's action could result in two conflicting decisions
regarding the child's habitual residence.331 Since the Convention
was meant "to ensure that rights of custody and access under the
322. See MARIANNE BLAIR ET AL., FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNIY 440
(2009).
323. See Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1078.
324. While a court should not casually shift the child's habitual residence based
upon the child's acclimatization, it is permissible. Id, at 1079.
325. See 114 F.3d 1531, 1535 (10th Cir. 1997).
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. Id. at 1537.
330. See id. at 1540.
331. See id. at 1541.
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law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in other
Contracting States," 332 the trial court had to dismiss the case or
else the court "would potentially render the Hague Convention
meaningless." 333
Similarly, a court should not pervert the article 12(2) well-
settled defense in its quest to deter abduction and punish
concealment of abducted children. It should recognize the
particular purpose of the article 12(2) defense and not
undermine it: a settled child has a strong interest in having all
the evidence related to custody considered by a court before the
child is returned. 34
IV. THE PREFERRED METHOD FOR ADDRESSING CASES
INVOLVING CONCEALMENT
Any attempt to resolve the conundrum of how to address
concealment within the context of the Convention should start
by acknowledging that the Convention is meant to benefit
children. Baroness Hale of Richmond aptly captured this point in
the case In re M (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) when she
said, "[I]t should not be thought that the Convention is
principally concerned with the rights of adults. Quite the
332. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 1 (b).
333. Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 1541.
334. The question arises whether equitable tolling is just as problematic as
equitable estoppel. On the one hand, both equitable tolling and equitable estoppel
undermine the child's interest in having a court hear all of the evidence related to
custody before returning the settled child. On the other hand, equitable tolling may be
more consistent with the drafters' intent than equitable estoppel. From early on, the
drafters recognized that a petitioner should not be prejudiced by delays occasioned by
the authorities mishandling the matter. In the Preliminary Draft Convention, for
example, the six-month period (during which the authorities had an obligation to
return the child forthwith) was calculated from the point at which an application was
filed for the child's return with the authorities of the place where the child was located.
See Preliminary Draft Convention Adopted by the Special Commission and Report by Elisa Prez-
Vera, supra note 104, at 168. P&ez-Vera explained, "[w]ith regard to the terminus ad
quem, the Special Commission has preferred to adopt the moment when the
application was introduced, rather than the date of the decision, considering that the
possible delay in the action of the competent authorities must not be prejudicial to the
interests which are protected by the Convention." Prez-Vera, supra note 96, at 202.
Given this, one might conclude that equitable tolling is more consistent with the
Convention than its equitable estoppel counterpart. Admittedly, however, this question
goes beyond the scope of the Article and further analysis of the issue is needed.
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reverse." 3 5  Her opinion demonstrates the truth of this
proposition by going through the Convention and its history. For
example, she refers to a passage in the Perez-Vera report:
" [T] hese exceptions are only concrete illustrations of the overly
vague principle whereby the interests of the child are stated to be
the guiding criterion in this area."336  Baroness Hale's
observations with regard to the proper interpretative orientation
seem entirely correct, even though, as discussed below, one
might disagree with certain conclusions drawn in that case (that
discretion exists to reject the article 12(2) defense after the child
is found to be well settled).
If one's focus is on the abducted child, as article 12(2)
intended, then one must assess whether the parent's
concealment is relevant to whether the child is well settled. It
seems obvious that concealment might be extremely relevant to
this question. A child who lives a life of deception may never
acquire the sort of connections or regularity that is the basis of
being "settled." On the other hand, concealment might
sometimes be irrelevant. After all, the child's life may be
minimally-if at all-affected by the parent's concealment.
Courts can, and should, take a parent's concealment into
account in their assessment of whether a child is settled. This can
be done without resort to equitable principles. The foreign
authorities mentioned above in Part III demonstrate how
concealment is very germane to an assessment of whether a child
is "settled." The assessment of whether a child is "settled" rests
on a fact-intensive inquiry into the child's circumstances,
including the child's living conditions and emotional tranquility.
The court should consider "any relevant factor informative of the
child's connection with his or her living environment. '" 337
Typically this includes the "child's age, the stability of the child's
335. [2007] UKHL 55, [12], [2008] 1 A.C. 1288, 1298 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U.K.); see also In re R (A Minor) (No. 2) [1999] IESC 32, at [19], [1999] 4 I.R. 185, 195
(Ir.). ("[T]he Hague Convention and the Act are instruments for the benefit of the
child. The child's interest is paramount. Consequently defences to the application of
plaintiff, which go to the core of the proceedings or which are specifically mentioned in
the Act, may be considered by the Court in spite of the reprehensible behaviour of the
[defendant].").
336. In re M, [2007] UKHL 55, [12] (citing Phrez-Vera, supra note 96, at 432).
337. Silvestri v. Oliva, 403 F. Supp. 2d 378, 387 (D.N.J. 2005); see also Joan Zoza,
Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs of Battered Women, 29 FAM.
L.Q. 273, 283 (1995).
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home, regular attendance at school or daycare, regular
attendance at church, the stability of the [parent] 's employment,
and the nature and proximity of friends and relatives."338 But it
can also include "any active measures taken to conceal a
child," 339 as these measures can affect the indicators of stability,
like regular attendance at school.
The benefit of this approach over the use of equitable
estoppel is that it keeps the inquiry where it should be-on the
child. This is consistent with the nature of the defense, which is
based on a fact-intensive inquiry about the child. Equitable
estoppel, in contrast, makes the abductor's actions predominate
in a way that is inconsistent with the child-focused nature of the
defense. In addition, focusing on whether the child is "settled"
allows a nuanced application of the article 12 defense instead of
barring any consideration of evidence under it. The actions of
the left-behind parent may become relevant to the extent that
those actions affect the child's current stability-just like the
actions of the abductor can become relevant. For example, the
fact that the abductor fled domestic violence is very relevant
because the absence of such violence in the new location may
explain why the child is well settled even if the child is in hiding.
Equitable estoppel, in contrast, carries with it the potential to
render irrelevant this sort of information about the left-behind
parent. Equitable estoppel stops the one-year threshold from
being met so that no further inquiry into the child's
circumstances is necessary.
Focusing on whether the child is "settled" is preferable to
the method by which some U.S. treaty partners have addressed
the issue. As discussed above, some courts outside of the United
States have found the discretion to return the child even when
338. In re B. Del C.S.B., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2007); accord Van
Driessche v. Ohio-Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 2d 828, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (citing In re
Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2004)). It would also include
the uncertain immigration status of the parent and the child. Giampaolo v. Erneta, 390
F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1281-82 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (including, among other factors, the status
of both the respondent and the child as illegal immigrants in assessing whether the child
was settled in the new environment).
339. Van Driessche, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (citing Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 946
(l1th Cir. 1998)); see also Silvestri, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (granting article 12(2) defense
and noting respondent did not try to frustrate father's efforts to locate his children and
that he visited them many times in the past few years); Re H (Abduction: Child of 16),
[2000] 2 F.L.R. 51, 55 (Fain.) (Eng.).
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the article 12 defense is made out.340 Several U.S. courts have also
taken this position.341 As one judge sitting in the Southern
District of New York stated:
[T]he petitioner's interests should be considered in
exercising the discretion to deny a petition even where facts
supporting an exception are established. Because the denial
of a petition pursuant to Article 12 is discretionary, equitable
tolling is unnecessary to deter an abductor from concealing
the whereabouts of a wrongfully removed or retained
child.342
Legal scholars have questioned whether the Convention
actually provides a court with discretion in this context.3 43 Even
the court in Cannon acknowledged that its conclusion on
discretion was arguably contrary to the Convention's legislative
history. 344 Without repeating too much of the debate here, it is
worth noting several points that make the existence of discretion
dubious. First, articles 13 and 20 both explicitly give the decision
maker discretion to return a child even after the defense is made
out, but article 12 does not.3 45 Second, the drafters wanted a
340. See supra notes 153-94 and accompanying text.
341. See Matovski v. Matovski, No. 06-cv-4259, 2007 WL 2600862, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 31, 2007); Antunez-Fernandes v. Connors-Fernandes, 259 F. Supp. 2d 800, 815
(N.D. Iowa 2003) (citing Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and
Legal Analysis, supra note 10, at 10,509). Yet, the State Department's legal analysis,
which is used to support this position, does not expressly say that the court has such
discretion. It only refers to the language, discussed above, that it is "highly questionable"
whether a court should grant the defense when there has been concealment. See supra
note 147.
342. Matovski, 2007 WL 2600862, at *12.
343. See, e.g., Rhona Schuz, In Search of a Settled Interpretation of Article 12(2) of the
Hague Child Abduction Convention, 20 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 1, 6 (2008).
344. Justice Thorpe said,
[W]hatever may have been the drafting intention and whatever may be the academic
criticism, the global judicial community in the main construes article 18 to
confer upon the court a discretion nevertheless to order return in a case
where the defendant has established both that the proceeding were
commenced more than twelve months after the abduction and that the child is
settled in a new environment.
Cannon v. Cannon, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1330, [48], (2005) 1 W.L.R. 32, 48 (emphasis
added).
345. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 13 ("[T]he judicial or
administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if
... there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation" and "[ t ] he
judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it
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court to examine all of the evidence relevant to custody before
returning a child who was well settled, and the importation of
discretion undercuts this objective. Third, it is difficult to
conclude that article 18 provides a court with any discretion to
return a child when the child is well settled, unless other
domestic measures would permit it.
Article 18 reads, "The provisions of this Chapter do not limit
the power of a judicial or administrative authority to order the
return of the child at any time."3 46 The travaux pr9paratOires
indicate that article 18 was aimed at domestic provisions separate
and apart from the Convention. From the beginning, articles 12
and 18 were intended to be complementary. 47 Article 15 of the
Preliminary Draft Convention, the predecessor to the current
article 18, stated, "The provisions of this Chapter do not limit the
power of judicial or administrative authorities to order the return
of the child after the expiration of the time-limits set out in
article 11 [now article 12]."348 Professor Perez-Vera explained
article 15's significance:
The practical importance of such a provision is undoubtedly
limited, considering that there is always, even in the absence
of a convention, the possibility of prescribing the child's
return, after the affair has been examined on its merits; but,
since some experts thought that its inclusion was necessary
for the relevant internal authorities to act in that way, the
Special Commission adopted the text with a large majority.3 49
Later, when the Federal Republic of Germany proposed
Working Document No. 25 (which would allow the judicial or
administrative authorities to return a child after the expiration of
the relevant time frame "unless it is demonstrated that the child
is now settled in his new environment and his return would cause
excessive prejudice"),3 50 the issue of the interrelationship of the
finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of
maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views." (emphasis added)).
346. Id. art. 18.
347. Perez-Vera, supra note 96, at 458 (referring to articles 11 and 15, later
renumbered 12 and 18); see also Preliminary Draft Convention Adopted by the Special
Commission and Report by Elisa Pfrez-Vera, supra note 104, at 168 (article 11).
348. Preliminary Draft Convention Adapted by the Special Commission and Report by Elisa
Prez-Vera, supra note 104, at 169 (article 15).
349. PCrez-Vera, supra note 107, at 202.
350. See Working Documents Nos. 20-25, supra note 123, at 274 (proposal number 25
by the Federal Republic of Germany).
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two articles again emerged. 351 In that context, the U.S. delegate
stated her understanding:
[She] understood article 15 as a facultative provision which
expressly did not limit the power of authorities to order the
return of the child at a later stage. It did not confer such a
power upon them, but merely implied that they could use
whatever proceedings or powers they possessed in domestic
law. In particular, article 15 did not leave a residual power in
judges after the expiration of the time-limits in article 11.
The proposals in Working Document No 25 would therefore
go beyond what was envisaged in the present text of article
15.352
Professor Prez-Vera confirmed that she shared the U.S.
delegate's understanding:
This provision [article 18] ... which imposes no duty,
underlines the non-exhaustive and complementary nature of
the Convention. In fact, it authorizes the competent
authorities to order the return of the child by invoking other
provisions more favourable to the attainment of this end.
This may happen particularly in the situations envisaged in
the second paragraph of article 12, i.e. where, as a result of
an application being made to the authority after more than
one year has elapsed since the removal, the return of the
child may be refused if it has become settled in its new social
and family environment. 353
In short, it appears that article 18 only gives courts the
power to use remedies in their domestic law to order the return
of a child after the article 12(2) defense is made out. It does not
give the courts the power within the Hague proceeding to deny
the well-settled defense. This, in fact, was the accepted
interpretation of the U.S. Department of State at the time of the
Convention's adoption. 354
This Article has recommended that courts consider
concealment only in so far as it impacts the determination of
351. See Proces-verbal No 7, supra note 110, at 295 (comment of the Federal Republic
of Germany).
352. Id. at 295 (comment of the United States). The provision was ultimately
renumbered Article 18 and was the same text as in it Preliminary Draft.
353. Perez-Vera, supra note 96, at 460.
354. See Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal
Analysis, supra note 10, at 10,507-08.
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whether a child is settled. Admittedly, this approach does not
eliminate all arbitrariness and inconsistency, two criticisms of
equitable estoppel and the discretionary approach. Like any fact-
intensive determination, courts that focus solely on whether a
child is well settled have the discretion to emphasize certain facts
over others or draw one of several potential conclusions based
upon the totality of the circumstances. For example, in Laps v.
Lops, the appellate court rejected an equitable tolling analysis,
but found that the children were not "settled" based on the
circumstances surrounding their living. 355 The court mentioned
the concealment, among other things.356 In fact, the father took
great measures to keep his children's whereabouts hidden. 357 For
example, his mother (the grandmother of the abducted
children) purchased a home for the father and children, but the
seller was to remain the legal owner until all mortgage payments
were paid, thereby helping to conceal its true ownership. 358 The
father had no checking account and only transacted business in
cash.3 59 He drove a vehicle registered under his mother's
name.360 He was not an employee, so he never gave out his social
security number.3 61 He never paid tax. 62 He had no credit
cards.363 He did not obtain a driver's license. 364 Overall, it took
the petitioner years to locate the children, despite the assistance
of approximately "eleven state, national, and international
agencies. "365
Nonetheless, the court's conclusion that the children were
not well settled was somewhat surprising since the children had
355. 140 F.3d 927, 946 (11th Cir. 1998).
356. The court also mentioned, for example, that the father "could be prosecuted
for his violations of state and federal law because he was committing 'four and five
misdemeanors ... to conceal, at least himself, from any authority.'" Id. (omission in
original). The father's potential future prosecution says little about whether the
children were well settled at the time of the filing.
357. See id. at 946 & n.27 (noting the "active measures [the father and
grandmother] were undertaking to keep Respondent Lops's and the children's
whereabouts concealed from Petitioner and the German (and other) authorities").
358. See id. at 931.
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See id. at 931-32.
365. Id. at 933.
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been living in the same home, attending the same private school,
and in the company of their father, grandmother, and other U.S.
relatives for approximately three years. Their grandmother's
participation in her grandchildren's lives should have
contributed to a finding that they were settled, although the
court found her involvement weighed against their being well
settled.366
Similarly, in Aluwes v. Mai,367 a Canadian court emphasized
the objectives of the Convention and interpreted the notion of
"settled" restrictively. 68 The mother in this case went into hiding
for approximately seven years after she fled to Canada from
Iowa.369 In the Hague proceeding, the Canadian court returned
the child even though the child had "developed and ...
maintained a strong network of loyal and devoted friends. [The
child] has done well in school and is heavily involved in activities
such as 4-H, riding and music lessons." 370 The child had lived in
Iowa, the place from which the child was abducted, for only three
years and in Nova Scotia for seven years.37' Nonetheless, the court
found reasons to conclude the child was not well settled, such as
the separation of the child's mother from her husband and their
illegal immigration status in Canada.372  Emphasizing the
"perceived stability of [the child's] position into the future," it
found "there is little true stability here" 373 despite evidence
"concerning place, home, school, friends and activities [that]
366. Id. at 946.
367. Aulwes v. Mai, [2002] NSCA 127, [2002] 220 D.L.R.4th 577 (Can.).
368. The appellate court took the position that it is "essential to apply the settled
exception with careful attention to both the individual circumstances of the child whose
return is sought and the broader purposes of the Convention." Id. at [62]. While
returning the child would not secure a prompt return or restore the status quo, id at
[72]-[74], the court noted that "two other factors strongly support the view that the
settled exception should not be applied here." Id. at [74]. The court then mentioned,
"the deterrent purpose of the Convention. ... By removing any benefit from abduction
and flight, such conduct is deterred." Id. at [75]. The court called her deception "breath
taking... making it all the more important to deter others from doing likewise." Id. at
[77]. It then stated the "most important consideration": that "the best interests of an
abducted child should generally be determined by the courts of the place of habitual
residence." Id. at [78]. This was because there were earlier allegations of abuse, which
the professionals in Iowa had investigated and the court there had addressed. Id. at [79].
369. Id. at [1].
370. Id. at [12].
371. Id. at [79].
372. Id. at [15]-[20].
373. Id. at [85].
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supports the view that KA. is now established in her community
in this province." 374 The court forthrightly admitted that it
believed a greater goal was at issue: "refusing to order return
would seriously undermine the Convention's intent to deter
international child abduction and to respect the role of the
Courts of Iowa in determining what [the child's] best interests
require."375
Despite the risk that courts will use concealment as a reason
to conclude that children are not well settled even when they are,
the well-settled inquiry still minimizes the chances that the
abductor's concealment will lead the court to the wrong
conclusion. Appellate courts can exercise much more
meaningful review in this context than when they review the
denial of the well-settled defense as an exercise of discretion, or
when equitable principles are invoked that limit the defense's
availability.
The only time when a trial court could not consider
concealment as part of the fact-specific analysis that the well-
settled doctrine demands is when the parties stipulate that the
child is settled.376 Presumably parties will stipulate less often that
the child is settled when courts reject the equitable estoppel
doctrine in the context of the article 12 defense. That means
both parties will focus on the child and whether the child is
settled instead of fighting about whether one parent was in
hiding or the other parent exercised due diligence to find the
child. Putting more attention on the child is always beneficial.
The approach advocated in this Article would not necessarily
increase the workload of the courts because a court would not
have to examine the petitioner's diligence. In addition, some
courts already engage in their own analysis to ensure that a child
is "settled" even when the parties so stipulate.377
374. Id.
375. Id. at [94].
376. See, e.g., Van Driessche v. Ohio-Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848 (S.D. Tex.
2006) ("Van Driessche concedes that Melissa is well-settled in Houston."); Morrison v.
Dietz, No. 6:07-CV-1398, 2008 WL 4280030, at *15 (W.D. La. Sept. 17, 2008), affd, No.
08-31003, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 23200 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 2009) ("The parties do not
dispute this issue [that both children are well settled].").
377. See, e.g., Van Driessche, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 848 ("[T]here is nothing in the
record to suggest that Melissa is not well-settled in Houston. To the contrary, the Court
finds there is substantial evidence that Melissa is well-settled ...."); Morrison, 2008 WL
4280030, at *15 (" [T]he Court finds that both children are well-settled.").
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CONCLUSION
Courts are increasingly permitting equitable principles to
affect Hague Convention adjudications even though there is a
weak basis for doing so. Courts justify their continued expansion
of equitable estoppel by noting that the doctrine eliminates the
benefit that might otherwise inure to a respondent who conceals
a child and then invokes the article 12(2) well-settled defense.
Yet equitable estoppel has the unfortunate side effect of denying
a settled child a more complete judicial examination of all the
evidence related to custody prior to his or her return. Since this
effect is contrary to the drafters' intent, one would expect a great
benefit from the continued use of equitable estoppel. Equitable
estoppel, however, appears to be of dubious value as a deterrent
to future abductors, especially since it is buried in the case law of
only one Convention signatory and since there are other, more
prominent legal tools to address concealment. Courts would
benefit abducted children if they stayed focused on the key
questions raised by the article 12 defense: (1) whether one year
has passed between the wrongful removal or retention and the
date the petitioner commenced proceedings, and (2) whether or
not the child is now settled. Concealment is certainly relevant to
the latter question, and courts should address concealment as
part of their fact finding on that issue.
